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Introduction
In 1977, Congress passed the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977
FCPA or the Act), which criminalized business bribery of foreign public
officials by both securities issuers and domestic concerns. For purposes of
implementing the prohibitions against business corruption contained in
the Act, the 1977 FCPA also imposed substantial accounting and internal-
control requirements on securities issuers. Congress substantially
amended the 1977 FCPA in 1988 to include a provision requiring the Presi-
dent to seek international cooperation in suppressing such business brib-
ery. Multilateral anti-corruption conventions followed after a marked lag.'
* Lynette S. Autrey Professor of Management at the Jesse H.Jones Graduate School
of Management, Rice University; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1978; A-M., Harvard
University, 1975; B.A., Rice University, 1969.
** Associate Professor and Chair of the Management Department at the Kogod
School of Business, American University; Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1991; M.B.A.,
Gannon University, 1986; B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1980.
1. In addition to the United States, Transparency International (TI) and the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) played a major role in motivating the multilateral
initiatives. For more information on TI, consult their website at <http://www.trans-
parency.org> [hereinafter TI website]. The ICC's website is <http://www.iccwbo.org>.
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The Organization of American States (OAS), in 1996,2 and the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1997,3
adopted differing multilateral anti-corruption conventions reflecting vary-
ing membership-specific concerns and circumstances. These respective
Conventions have been signed by all the members to these two organiza-
tions, and member nations currently are engaged in the various stages of
formal ratification and implementation by domestic legislation. Upon
adoption of the OECD Convention by the United States, Congress further
amended the FCPA in 1998, in order to bring U.S. law into conformity.
4
The OAS and OECD Conventions are open to other nations.
The OAS is a strictly regional association of Western Hemisphere
countries. Most OAS member nations are developing countries, which
rank poorly on Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perception
Index (CPI). 5 The United States is greatly concerned with illegal drug traf-
ficking operations originating within the Western Hemisphere, particularly
from Latin America, and with the related problem of money laundering
activities by financial institutions.
In contrast to the OAS, the OECD is a worldwide association com-
prised mostly of advanced-economy nations. The OECD arose as a con-
sultative body, the so-called "Triad," among North America, Western
Europe, and Asia-Pacific industrial democracies and trading partners.
Membership has expanded in recent years to include Mexico, a member of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as certain for-
merly-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Other nations
are invited to join the Convention through the OECD Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions, and five countries, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic, have done so. As part
of its effort to reduce international business corruption, the OECD issued a
recommendation, affecting some fourteen European countries, to eliminate
tax deductibility of foreign bribe payments. 6
2. See OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC), Mar. 29,
1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) (effective Mar. 6, 1997). The OAS website is <http://
www.oas.org>.
3. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) (effective Feb. 15,
1999). The monitoring procedure began in April 1999 and was scheduled to be com-
pleted during Spring 2000. The OECD website is <http://www.oecd.org>.
4. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(effective Dec. 19, 1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-
2, 78ff) (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk (1976)), as amended by
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1415 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff
(1994) as amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
5. See infra tbl.1. The CPI is reported annually by TI, a non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) based in Germany. See TI website, supra note 1.
6. See Anti-Corruption Unit, OECD, Update on the Implementation of the OECD Rec-
ommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials (Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/tax.htm#annex>.
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The European Union is comprised of fifteen countries, all of which are
members of the OECD. The EU Convention on the Fight Against Corrup-
tion Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of the
Member States of the European Union (EU Convention) addresses bribery
of EU officials.7
The OAS, OECD, and EU Conventions all adopt, albeit in variously
modified forms, the FCPA's principle of extraterritorial and supply-side
criminalization of home-country business bribery of host-country foreign
officials and international public organization officials. Nearly all nations
historically prohibited bribery of their own officials, although such
demand-side regulation was evidently ineffective in preventing bribery and
extortion in many countries; and it is commonplace, if not universal, to
forbid commercial corruption as well.8
An impressive array of other multilateral entities, including the United
Nations (U.N.), 9 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),10 the
Council of Europe," the World Bank,12 and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), I3 have adopted resolutions or efforts directed toward the
reduction and ultimate elimination of international business corruption.' 4
In particular, the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in
International Commercial Transactions (U.N. Declaration) and the U.N.
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (U.N. Draft Code) 15
7. See 1997 Oj. (C 195). The EU website is <europa.eu.int>.
8. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization
and Fragmentation, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 257, 258-59 (1999) [hereinafter Nichols, Regulat-
ing Bribery] (citing additionally FRrrz F. HEmAm, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 2
(1994), and LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A COMPILATION OF BRIBERY AND EXTORTION LAWS IN
OPIC CouN-RIEs (1976); Julie B. Nesbit, Note, Transnational Bribery of Foreign Officials:
A New Threat to the Future of Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1273, 1274 n.1
(1998) (citing Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World
Trade Organization, 28 LAw & POLY INTL Bus. 305, 318-21 (1997) [hereinafter Nichols,
Outlawing Bribery]).
9. See U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, Agenda
Item 12, at 178, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (1996). For more information on the United
Nations (U.N.), visit the U.N.'s website at <http://www.un.org>.
10. See International Chamber of Commerce, 1996 Revisions to the ICC Rules of
Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, Mar. 26,
1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1306 (1996).
11. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted a Programme of Action
Against Corruption (Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption) in 1996. The Council of
Europe website is <http://www.coe.fr>.
12. The World Bank website is <http://www.worldbank.org>.
13. The IMF website is <http://www.imf.org>.
14. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 267 n.50. Philip Nichols argues
that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has the authority to act in this matter. See
Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of
the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 711 (1996). To
date, however, the WTO, established in 1994 as the broader, institutionalized successor
to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiating process, has
not formally acted.
15. The U.N. Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations has not yet been
implemented. Notably, however, it includes FCPA-like anti-bribery and financial disclo-
sure language. See U.N. Draft Code, % 20, reprinted in LEE E. PRESTON & DuANqE WIND-
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together indicate worldwide recognition that business bribery of foreign
officials is wrong. Indeed, the endorsement of anti-corruption initiatives
by such a broad range of multinational entities attributes strong moral
authority 16 to the actions of regional and global associative bodies, such as
the OAS and the OECD, to combat corruption globally through extraterri-
torial actions and to influence other countries not formally adhering to
their conventions. As Bill Shaw argues, the principles first articulated by
the 1977 FCPA and subsequently strengthened by its progeny have become
"morally unassailable." 17
The authors characterize the FCPA, as amended in 1988 and again in
1998, and these recent multilateral conventions as important but early
steps in the development of an effective global anti-corruption regime, one
that is gradually becoming institutionalized despite mixed motives and
diverse values concerning corruption on the part of adhering member
nations. The U.N. Draft Code' 8 reflects the complexity that results from
world-scale bargaining and that has retarded its final adoption. 19
The diversity of participant motives and values includes matters affect-
ing economic self-interest, political ideology, national sovereignty, diplo-
matic leadership, and moral philosophy. "Economic self-interest" is not a
simple notion, as it necessarily incorporates arguments pertaining to mar-
ket efficiency, distribution of wealth and business opportunity, compara-
tive and competitive advantage, and resource allocation.20 "Economic
motives" include the creation and distribution of revenues, profits, and
jobs and their attendant repercussions. "Political or diplomatic motives"
SOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 249-67 (1st ed. 1992) (reprinting the proposed text of the Draft Code, as of the
early 1990s).
16. See William C. Frederick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes,
10 J. Bus. ETHICS 165 (1991).
17. See Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassaila-
ble, 33 CORNELL INT' LJ. 689 (2000).
18. See the proposed text of the U.N. Draft Code, as of the early 1990's, reprinted in
PRESTON & WINDsOR, supra note 15, at 246-47.
19. See PRESTON & WINDSOR, supra note 15, at 249-67. The drafting process began
in 1974, following revelations concerning alleged activities of ITT, a U.S. firm, in Chile.
The Code attempts to address in global and comprehensive form enterprise respect for
national sovereignty including domestic laws, conformity with national economic devel-
opment policy, good-faith negotiation, respect for domestic socio-cultural objectives and
values-a matter that could embrace value diversity with respect to corruption and
gifts-respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, non-collaboration with
apartheid in South Africa, and non-interference in host country affairs and intergovern-
mental relations. The draft also addresses governmental treatment of transnational
enterprises and a number of other issues. See generally id.
20. See Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corpo-
rate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 389, 442 (1997) (arguing that "present multilateral initiatives to fight corrup-
tion are motivated by the economic self-interest of countries and businesses who believe
that honesty and efficiency are closely linked"). The argument is cited in Nora M.
Rubin, Note, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Brib-
ery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD Recommen-
dations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 257, 315 n.364 (1998).,
Vol. 33
2000 Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption
involve a complex of considerations centered on the roles of particular
countries and regions in international relations. "Norm diversity" in this
context covers a complex of issues as well, which might arguably be viewed
as interlinked, including national sovereignty and political devolution, eco-
nonic independence, and equality of cultural values. The controversy sur-
rounding norm diversity centers on whether one country, or set of
countries, however powerful, can and should attempt to impose its own
views of morality or normalcy upon other nations with different views or
traditions.
The present anti-corruption conventions thus may blossom into much
broader initiatives, aimed at much more than merely suppressing business
bribery of foreign public officials. Indeed, the anti-corruption campaign is
gradually becoming, as was always implicit in the FCPA, a campaign for
democracy and market-oriented development. Concern includes the
effects of domestic corruption in OECD countries; the costs of endemic
foreign corruption to OECD multinational enterprises; and the reportedly
now epidemic nature of corruption in developing, emergent, and transition
economies. 21
The conventions discussed above should not be regarded simply as
expressions of value convergence,22 and hence, as self-centering moral
regimes. Adherence to a diplomatic convention should not necessarily be
construed as a reflection of or a change in motives and values. Rather, the
circumstances suggest that the emerging anti-corruption regime should
properly be understood as calculated behavior modification, albeit in a
normative direction, rather than as voluntary moral or ethical commit-
ment. In simple terms, while a regime necessarily involves reasonably sta-
ble mutual expectations concerning functional behavior, it need not
involve a moral principle. To use a familiar example, automobiles are
driven on one side of the road simply in order to enhance general safety.
A global anti-corruption regime does involve, in part, what can plausi-
bly be deemed a moral principle, namely that bribery and extortion are
ethically unacceptable, even if economically and politically tolerable.
Thus, norms dearly may arise as a result of moral principles. However, a
norm is simply a standard for behavior, and a normative regime can also
rest on cynical collaboration or calculated self-interest, entirely devoid of
any underlying moral principle. Regardless of its origin, whether inspired
21. The following rough classification scheme is used: advanced economies are
mostly the industrial democracies of the OECD; emergent economies, often termed
newly industrialized countries (NICs) are certain relatively industrialized, but not neces-
sarily democratic, countries important to the OECD (see infra tbl.1, for a rough list);
transition economies are the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (the former Czechoslovakia, USSR, and Yugoslavia having disintegrated); devel-
oping economies are effectively all other countries (although one can debate whether
some of these countries might be classified as NICs: for instance, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, China, India, Mexico). The term emergent economies is used here to restrict
attention to certain countries, less advanced although certainly developed, of special
relevance to the OECD as a whole, whether members of the OECD or EU or not.
22. See Alex Y. Seita, Globaliation and the Convergence of Values, 30 ComRiaL IN'L
Lj. 429 (1997).
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by values, economic self-interest, or cynicism, the regime can nevertheless
produce a desirable modification of behavior. This realization is an impor-
tant one to understand, for it is fundamental to crafting a successful anti-
corruption campaign worldwide.
The alignment of differing motives and values, as also occurs in the
U.N. and WTO processes, requires gradualism of regime development. A
normative regime may evolve through the preference intensity of some
actors-such as the United States, TI, and the ICC, for example-and
despite the lack of interest of, and even in the face of resistance by, other
important actors. Alex Seita argues that because "the exact form of global-
ization is not a fixed certainty," nations committed to the promotion of
liberal democratic values "should aggressively configure globalization to be
consistent with" their interests.23 If so, such countries push extraterritori-
ality relative to comity in international relations. In Seita's view, "enlight-
ened globalization" can and should alter attitudes.24 Our view is that, at
least initially, only calculated behavior modification is necessary.
The authors are management scholars educated in the social sciences.
Their interest lies in understanding the fundamental nature, key driving
forces, and likely consequences of multilateral cooperation in the emerging
global economy. Cooperation, or collaboration, and the closely related
notion of trust have become central to the stakeholder theory of the collec-
tive.25 Participants in multilateral cooperation arrangements are stake-
holders in the benefits or costs of these arrangements. Each adherent to
the OAS, OECD, and EU Conventions must necessarily undertake some
form of cost benefit calculation weighing the disadvantages and advantages
of formal consent to these conventions, including implementation and sub-
sequent enforcement of new domestic laws and the adherent's interna-
tional diplomatic conduct.
Timothy Fort and James Noone emphasize the importance of linking
actor restraint from corruption with actor self-interest and community wel-
fare perception. Trade, in principle, increases everyone's wealth, at least in
aggregation, and promotes peace.26 In our view, it is simultaneously possi-
ble to address actor self-interest directly by increasing the penalties for mis-
23. Id. at 431-32.
24. Id. at 432.
25. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corpora-
tion: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 65, 65-91 (1995) (depict-
ing stakeholder theory as akin to an onion with embedded dimensions). Donaldson and
Preston argue that the core of stakeholder theory is normative-for example, a moral
theory of justly distributed property rights-and the surface is descriptive-empirical-
for example, a realistic understanding of both the world and reform possibilities. The
intervening dimension is instrumental-a purely cause-and-effect understanding of
management actions. See Thomas M.Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis
of Ethics and Economics, 20 AcAD. MGmT. REv. 404, 404-37 (1995) (arguing that coopera-
tion founded in mutual trust should outperform competition founded in pure self-
interest).
26. See Timothy L. Fort &JamesJ. Noone, Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange: Relationships
in Non-Market Economies and Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33 CORNELL INrA L.J. 515(2000).
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conduct without respect to community welfare arguments. As the world
becomes increasingly integrated economically, international investment,
trade, and communication are growing even more rapidly than gross
domestic production.27 Consequently, multilateral cooperation in many
spheres of international interaction is becoming both more important and
more prevalent. 28
The complexity of multilateral cooperation arises in part from the fact
that there are multiple arrangements and institutions-partly overlapping,
partly reinforcing, and partly competing or conflicting. The number,
types, and forms of arrangements are likely to increase. Complexity also
arises partly from the fact that international politics proceeds at two levels:
international and domestic (or intranational). 29 The world is becoming a
"club of clubs,"30 and the WTO may evolve to become a kind of "economic
constitution" for the world.31 Nichols points out, however, that the trans-
national institutions for sustaining global economic interaction "must be
cobbled together from the institutions of various countries."32
A long debate over the FCPA and its amendments within the legal,
management, and social science disciplines has involved complex issues
concerning motives, cultures, consequences, ethics, and strategies. To
impose some rough sense of logical structure on this complexity, we use a
simple two-by-two matrix, depicted below in Figure 1, intended to reveal
the relationships among these issues. As constructed, each of the four cells
of the matrix represents the viewpoint of one of four distinct, extreme
27. Lee Presten and Duane Windsor calculated in nominal dollars-from UN Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank, and IMF data series-that
between 1970 and 1994, annual world GDP, a measure excluding imports but including
exports, grew about 746.8% (a compound annual growth rate of 16.48%), while annual
world exports grew 1266.9% (a compound annual growth rate of 20.54%) and annual
foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows grew 1615.5% (a compound annual growth
rate of 22.51%). See LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF TiE GAME IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 29, 30 (2d ed. 1997).
The nominal 1994 amounts were roughly $25.7 trillion GDP, $4.3 trillion exports, and
$222 billion FDI. Nominal data have to be corrected for inflation, but the same infla-
tion adjustment would occur across the three measures, and all three compound annual
growth rates are well above any reasonable estimate of inflation. The World Bank esti-
mated the gross national product (GNP) deflator at about 7.6% annually over this
period. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1996).
28. Various examples in business operations (consumer protection, restrictive busi-
ness practices, international sale of goods, multinational enterprises); regional and
associative arrangements; international transport; telecommunications; financial ser-
vices; environmental protection; and trade, monetary, and investment cooperation are
reported in PRESTON & WINDsoR, supra note 27.
29. See DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
(Peter B. Evans et aL eds., 1993).
30. ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE Er AL., INTEGRATING NATIONAL ECONOMIES: PROMISE AND PIT-
FALLS 14 (1996).
31. See WTO Denies Claims by Special Interests Linking Ruggiero to MAI [Multilateral
Agreement on Investment], WTO Doc. PRESS/91 (Feb. 17, 1998) (summarizing Jan. 16,
1998 speech by then-WTO Director-General, Renato Ruggiero, at Chatham House,
London, quoting Professor John Jackson of the University of Michigan).
32. Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 260.
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schools of thought that contribute to the debate. Each cell links an atti-
tude, or expectation, with logically implied conduct. The horizontal axis
defines a continuum spanning from "universalism," at one extreme, to
"particularism," at the other.33
The vertical axis defines a continuum spanning from "moralism" to
"realism."34 The distinction between universalism, or globalism, and par-
ticularism, or localism, is well established in current corruption and busi-
ness ethics literature. We introduce the distinction between moralism and
realism deliberately, drawing from international relations literature. In
interpreting Figure 1, one should bear in mind the difference between eth-
ics, which is the term applicable to behaving morally by choice, and moral-
ism, which describes the act of presuming, typically from local custom, the
right thing to do in particular, and likely gray, circumstances. Realism is
self-interest maximization in all circumstances, whether or not such max-
imization dictates regard for the well-being of others. Because the end-
points of these two continua are polar-opposite extremes, the labels within
the cells should be regarded as defining the outside corners of each cell.
Also the reader should note that combinations of views and conducts
might arguably be found along the intervening continua.
The horizontal axis reflects the debate concerning whether regional
and global diversity of values or a universal anti-corruption attitude should
prevail. This debate thus concerns the dispute over whether extraterritori-
ality or comity should govern conduct with respect to corruption. Extrater-
ritoriality arguably disregards the legitimate, or at least explainable, values
of other cultures and conflates gifts or gratuities with extortion.35 One
consequence of global anti-corruption efforts may be the elimination of
33. The case for universalism, and hence extraterritoriality, is well argued by Seita,
supra note 22, and Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MIcH. J. Irr'i L.
451 (1999). The case for what we shall term particularism (or localism), that is for
cultural diversity and hence comity, is well argued by Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 419 (1999), and
Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of International Corrupt Payments:
Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is Not the Answer, 1 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 3
(1995). The concept of particularism is explicated in ALFONS (FoNs) TROMPENAARS, Pt-
ING THE WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS (2d ed., 1998).
Particularism is at work in the anti-corruption conventions to the degree that the agree-
ments are adapted to participants' concerns and circumstances rather than simply clon-
ing the FCPA. See CHARLES HAMPDEN-TuRNER & ALFONS (FoNs) TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN
CULTURES OF CAPITALISM: VALUE SYSTEMS FOR CREATING WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, BRITAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE NETHERLANDS (1993).
34. See Hans Rommen, Realism and Utopianism in World Affairs, 6 REv. POL. 193,
193-215 (1944). "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.
Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate
aim.... When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of
other men." HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 13 (1950).
35. See Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International
Markets: Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 327 (1994).
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customary gift-giving and gratuities practices not truly constituting corrup-
tion. Another consequence may be what some could regard as gray corrup-
tion in the form of gifts to local communities with benefits accruing to
host-country officials in the form of recognition for obtaining such corpo-
rate donations.
The vertical axis distinguishing moralism from realism reflects the
regional and global diversity of motives with respect to action against cor-
ruption. This axis concerns the dispute over whether the United States
acted rationally in passing, first, the 1977 FCPA and, subsequently, the
1988 amendments, which directly pressured other nations to join the OAS
and OECD Conventions. The authors' view is that U.S. conduct reflects a
mix of moralism and economic self-interest.
The four cells of the resulting matrix are defined as follows. Localized
networks of corrupt relationships, found in many developing or transition
countries and at least some advanced and emergent countries,3 6 would
implicate, in combination, the extremes of particularism and realism. The
presence of localized corruption pockets implies for foreigners a natural
bribery strategy abroad, assuming they function domestically within analo-
gous, corrupt networks. The extreme form of moralism and universalism,
in combination, is the expectation of or insistence on global value conver-
gence.3 7 A global value convergence form implies for foreigners a natural
moralism that actively suppresses both foreign bribery and domestic cor-
ruption as incompatible with moral values and economic efficiency. This
form, however, will likely resemble a moral crusade asserting universal val-
ues such as democracy and markets. These two opposed forms are what
Amartya Sen characterizes as "behavioral codes," as distinguished from
moral calculation.38
The design of the Figure I matrix is such that the diagonal from global
value convergence to local corruption networking-that is, from the upper
left to the lower right corner of the matrix- defines natural or likely con-
duct for moralists and realists, and the international policy problem is that
no global regime operates across the intervening boundary. Universal mor-
alists cannot approve of local corruption. Given the strong evidence of cor-
ruption in many of the OAS countries, and in some of the OECD countries,
there must be a scientifically valid cause-and-effect explanation for their
sudden formal adherence to the anti-corruption conventions because they
36. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BAsis OF A BACKWARD SocIETY
(1958); Richard P. Nielsen, The Politics of Long Term Corruption Reform: A Combined
Social Movement and Action-Learning Approach, 10 Bus. ETHics Q. 305 (2000).
37. Seita, supra note 22, characterizes globalization in terms of an economic market
integration process, a political spread of democracy and human rights among nations,
an ideology of rule of law and substantive principles for peaceful international dispute
settlement and agreement negotiation, increased perceived importance of distant inter-
national, relative to local, problems, and common economic and political values for
humanity. However, Seita characterizes convergence of fundamental values in terms of
deeply held moral beliefs. It is perhaps rather the case that such beliefs, where diver-
gent, would retard cooperation. See id.; see also Nesbit, supra note 8.
38. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM 267, 275-79 (1999) (examining
corruption in some detail).
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are in theory moving from local corruption tolerance, if not practice, to
global value endorsement. That they have suddenly acquired a civic "relig-
ion" seems a dubious explanation; that they may gradually acquire "faith"
with future experience is a different matter.
The other diagonal continuum-that is, from upper right corner to
lower left corner-that can be defined in Figure 1 contrasts two opposing
approaches to strategic or calculated action. The extreme form of moral-
ism and particularism in combination defines a calculated strategy of pas-
sive, self-interested practice that is, nevertheless, within voluntary moral
constraint. In other words, this form of self-interested practice within vol-
untary moral constraint contemplates an actor who may disapprove of cor-
ruption, but will neither actively practice nor actively oppose it as a matter
of realism. The Ford Administration's proposed disclosure approach and
the Swedish anti-corruption statute, both discussed in Section II, come
closest to this form. Adherence to a convention could arguably be barely
one step away from this corner of the matrix; realism may dictate public
consent followed by studied inaction.
The extreme form of universalism and realism defines a calculated
strategy of directive gradualism, operating, in the authors' view, from
mixed motives. The U.S. drive for international cooperation, stemming
from the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, comes closest to this form, in that
the drive has been grounded in both moralistic assertions and economic
and political self-interest. The circumstance that concerted, yet not neces-
sarily collaborative, action can occur despite mixed motives and diverse
values suggests that a global anti-corruption campaign is that much easier
to initiate where one party, such as the United States, is willing to bear the
costs of leadership. 39
Figure 1.
Four Schools of Thought Concerning Corruption Abroad
Moralism
Realism
Universalism Particularism
Global Value Convergence Passive Self-Interest
Directive Gradualism Local Corruption Networks
Voluntary multilateral cooperation may suggest win-win conditions
where all parties benefit in some form and some degree. 40 The North
39. Concerted action can occur by parallel incentives that simply move all actors in a
roughly similar direction and toward an ultimate outcome. Collaborative action requires
deliberate coordination. The multilateral anti-corruption conventions involve no
regional or associative enforcement mechanism and rely upon national implementation
and enforcement. For an instance of parallel incentives-argued as a legal defense
against antitrust enforcement-see Thomas K. McGraw & Richard S. Tedlow, Ready to
Regulate Ready to Eat (Al), Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 381065 (revised Oct. 1981).
40. In neoclassical economic theory, a Pareto efficiency improvement-for example,
an overall or aggregative gain in wealth-occurs when at least one party gains and no
other party loses. The latter can have no rational objection to the former's gain. Pareto
efficiency improvement is not a basis for voluntary cooperation; rather it is simply a
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949 pursuant to the
North Atlantic Treaty, reflected multilateral recognition of mutual security
necessity. The European Economic Community (EEC), established in
1957 pursuant to the treaties and Convention of Rome,41 and the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), established in 1960,42
reflected multilateral recognition of very different types of mutual eco-
nomic opportunity. The EEC aimed at promotion of trade, whereas OPEC
aimed at exploitation of increased monopoly power of a vital economic
resource. But mutual gain is not necessarily the only basis for multilateral
cooperation, which can involve involuntary elements. The authors' analy-
sis of multilateral cooperation with respect to corruption is that specific
win-lose or competitive distribution conditions, such that someone is los-
ing something, are embedded even within general win-win or aggregate-
gain conditions.43 In this context, the participants in multilateral arrange-
ments, including the United States, act from mixed motives and under con-
ditions of considerable norm diversity with respect to both the
acceptability of bribery and extortion as forms of corruption and the likeli-
hood and cost of suppression of bribery and extortion in the global
economy.
Without attempting to develop here a general theory of involuntary
cooperation, two less-than-ideal circumstances can be delineated. The
most extreme circumstance is the pure application of what is effectively
imperial power-that is, dominance and control by one country over other,
theoretically sovereign nations. A classic, now-defunct example, created in
emulation of and counterbalance to the EEC and NATO, was the USSR-
imposed dual structure of the euphemistically named Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA), established in 1949, and the Warsaw Pact,
established in 1955, by which the USSR controlled the economic and mili-
non-interference, or consent, principle. The basis of the principle is aggregative wealth
without respect to distributive justice considerations. Sen argues that aggregative and
distributive wealth principles are equally important and legitimate. See SEN, supra note
38, at 286.
41. The EEC comprised Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
West Germany. The three Benelux countries were already participating in a customs
union (1948), as were France and Italy (1949). The EEC involved overlapping member-
ship as well in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951
pursuant to the Treaty of Paris, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),
established in 1957 pursuant to the second Treaty of Rome. A 1957 Rome Convention
joined the newly created European Assembly-the European Parliament after 1962, the
Court ofJustice of the European Communities, and the Economic and Social Committee
(ECOSOC) into a common political structure, which can be regarded as a form of con-
federation. See PRESTON & WINDsoR, supra note 15, at 141.
42. OPEC comprises (date of adhesion shown parenthetically) Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela (1960), Qatar (1961), Libya, Indonesia (1962), Algeria (1969),
Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973-93), United Arab Emirates (1974, Abu Dhabi, 1964-74
only), and Gabon (1975). Canada and Mexico are, significantly for the United States,
not members of OPEC, nor are the European countries participating in North Sea oil
and gas exploitation. See OPEC, History (visited Jan. 23, 2001) <http://www.opec.org/
about.opec/history.htm>.
43. See Sen's distinction between aggregation and distribution. See SEN, supra note
38.
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tary affairs of Central and Eastern Europe purely for its own, imperial self-
interest. 44 The Warsaw Pact disintegrated in 1991 with the dissolution of
the USSR, and, subsequently, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
The other circumstance is better characterized as influence rather
than dominance or control, although obviously the distribution of influ-
ence resources is not equal and threats of retaliation in some form, explicit
or veiled, may be employed. One party may seek to influence other parties
to undergo a change in behavior either for its own benefit, at the others'
loss, or to achieve mutual gains, incapable of arising absent a change of
behavior that the other parties are not likely to undertake voluntarily. It is
this circumstance, or rather perhaps a set of like circumstances, that char-
acterizes the development of multilateral cooperation concerning bribery
of public officials by foreign enterprises. The cooperation necessarily
involves a redistribution of the gains and losses that occur as a result of the
behavior modification, and this redistribution may more accurately be
thought of as "co-opetition," defined as a mix of cooperation and competi-
tion elements. 45
The two types of non-ideal circumstances discussed above can be con-
fused, and it can and has been argued that efforts to legislate control of
bribery and extortion in the global economy constitute economic, moral,
and cultural imperialism. If this argument has merit, then it applies not
only to the instance of the United States attempting to orchestrate multilat-
eral cooperation but also to OECD-concerted action aimed at developing
countries and even the most extreme hypothetical instance of all countries
save one agreeing on the merits of multilateral cooperation. (The U.N.
Declaration effectively co-opts all countries.) The view of the one disagree-
ing country cannot be evaluated against the extraordinary majoritarian
consensus and discounted; rather, the deviating view is intrinsically admis-
sible on the logic of the argument.
I. Evolution of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
In the aftermath of the Watergate crisis, the United States moved first and
unilaterally on the matter of extraterritorial prohibition of business bribery
of foreign officials to criminalize such bribery under the 1977 Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act.4 6 The only other nation to adopt extraterritorial prohi-
44. The CMEA members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and USSR in Europe, together with Cuba, Mongolia, and North Viet-
nam (later Vietnam). Albania was a member only during 1949-195 1. Yugoslavia main-
tained special status rather than full membership. China and North Korea were never
members. The relationships with Albania, China, North Korea, and Yugoslavia marked
the effective limits of Soviet economic and military influence. In 1991, CMEA became
the Organization for International Economic Cooperation. See PRESTON & WINDSOR,
supra note 15, at 150-51.
45. See generally ADAm M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, Co-OPErTiON
(1996).
46. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494; see also supra note 4.
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bition was Sweden, which followed suit, in limited fashion, in 1978.47 In
direct contrast, some fourteen European countries continued to permit
deduction of foreign bribe payments on business tax obligations in some
form.48 The following section is not a comprehensive history or analysis of
the 1977 FCPA and its 1988 and 1998 amendments.49 It is important,
however, to have a general sense of the statute and its two decades of
evolution.50
The 1977 FCPA resulted from a political bandwagon effect.5 ' As
David Slade notes, statutory action seemed mandatory to Congress in the
grip of a post-Watergate morality.52 No public official or private individ-
ual or entity could effectively oppose the movement to the FCPA because
opposition was regarded as tantamount to active endorsement of
corruption.
Revelations 53 that U.S. business firms had been making corrupt pay-
ments to foreign officials confronted the U.S. government with a continu-
ing "serious foreign policy dilemma"54 that persists today. The U.S.
government faced six logically definable options arranged here from least
47. See David R. Slade, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments: Enforcing a Multilateral
Agreement, 22 HALv. IiNr'L LJ. 117, 122 n.22 (1981) ("The general anticorruption statute
recently enacted in Sweden applies expressly to corrupt payments to foreign public
employees, if such payments are made domestically or in a foreign country that also
punishes them."). Effective January 1, 1978, the statute amended the Swedish Penal
Code, SFS § 103 (1977). See id.; see also Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the
New Swedish Provisions on Corruption, 27 Am. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979). However, the
statute requires perfect reciprocity-the foreign country must also punish such pay-
ments when made to Swedish as well as domestic officials, the United States being the
only country with such a statute-and that an offender be in some way connected with
Sweden-for example, an alien offender caught in Sweden at some time. See Slade,
supra, at 122. Slade further states that "[t]he anticorruption laws of both Norway and
the Netherlands apply to foreign corrupt payments to non-public officials (for example,
private executives) regardless of their nationality if such a payment is illegal in the state
where made and is made by a national or domiciliary." Id.
48. The United States amended federal income tax laws in 1958 to deny tax deduc-
tions for bribes paid to foreign officials. See I.R.C. § 162(C) (1994); Lucinda A. Low et
al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Comparison with the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INTr'L L. 243, 256 (1998). Prohibition of
domestic bribery occurred in 1948. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1948) (amended 1962 and
1994); Low et al., supra, at 256. "Section 201 (b), as enacted in 1962, served as a model
for the FCPA." Low et al., supra, at 255 n.40 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-640, at 8
(1977); S. REP. No. 94-1031, at 7 (1977).
49. For a comprehensive analysis, Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A
Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & Lm L. REv. 229 (1997).
50. See GEORGE C. GREANAus & DuA WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE (1982), for a general history of the early legislative process,
including initial Republican efforts at amendment of the 1977 FCPA.
51. See Duane Windsor, Modeling the Swine Flu Decision, in MODELING UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY 194-95 (S.B. Jones & D.G.S. Davies eds., 1986).
52. See Slade, supra note 47, at 117.
53. See id. The Watergate Special Prosecutor's office discovered information that
bribes had been paid by U.S. firms to foreign as well as to U.S. officials. The U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched a "voluntary disclosure program," under
which U.S. firms could report questionable foreign payments. Id.
54. Id.
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to most comprehensive action: (1) complete indifference-do nothing-as
one may characterize the subsequent European and Japanese solution; (2)
no action beyond an investigation, on the theory that while knowing about
corruption is generally desirable, specific corrective action is not;5 5 (3)
formalistic resolution to the effect that foreign bribery is morally wrong;56
(4) requirement of disclosure of bribery activities without criminalization,
which was the Ford Administration's proposal, discussed below; (5) con-
clusion, as happened in the 1988 amendments, that the President should
diplomatically seek international collaboration, with or without the disclo-
sure provision but presumably incorporating the formalistic resolution; or
(6) unilateral criminalization and other deterrents to conduct, such as
reporting and internal accounting system requirements,5 7 the initial
approach adopted by the Congress in the 1977 FCPA.
The 1977 FCPA did not specifically include a provision for interna-
tional diplomacy; rather, this provision was enacted in the 1988 amend-
ments. Thus, the push to attain international cooperation took roughly
two decades, from 1977 to the mid-1990s, to realize. One might argue that
the initiation of a global anti-corruption movement would have been sub-
stantially delayed absent the FCPA. The opposite argument is conceivable
too, that is that the FCPA perhaps created a stronger incentive for Europe
and Japan not to cooperate both because U.S. firms became less competi-
tive and the 1977 FCPA did not mandate international diplomatic action,
thereby blunting its extraterritorial reach.5 8 While the statute included an
explicit extraterritorial reach provision that employees or agents could be
citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States or "otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States,"5 9 there is limitation in that "the
FCPA... applies to U.S. entities doing business overseas, but also requires
a nexus to U.S. commerce."60
In retrospect, the legislative process was effectively a moral crusade
combined with a rough, and possibly self-serving, estimate that economic
and diplomatic consequences would be, if not strictly trivial, then at least
reasonably acceptable, or, even more strongly, that unilateral criminal pro-
hibition would be a positive advantage for U.S. firms abroad.6 1 In the
55. Sen emphasizes the importance of the information base for democratic policy-
making. See SEN, supra note 38, at 55.
56. This option attempts Fredericek's moral authority approach, adopted by the U.N.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1977); Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George,
Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provi-
sions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (a Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 TRAr'SNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 119 (1998).
58. See Low et al., supra note 48, at 259 n.51 ("The legislative history of the Act
makes clear that Congress considered and rejected the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries
in the definition of 'domestic concern."').
59. Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding
British and Saudi Arabian defendants covered by the FCPA).
60. Low et al., supra note 48, at 276.
61. Slade reports that testimony before Congress suggested that prohibition would
not be detrimental to U.S. competitiveness. See Slade, supra note 47, at 117 n.3.
2000 Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption
United States, the post-Watergate situation was not only one of moralism
but of revelation of concealment of corrupt payments within a securities
statutory framework invoking central principles of transparency and prohi-
bition of insider trading.
A pragmatic exception was nevertheless made for "routine governmen-
tal action" in the form of "facilitating or expediting payment" to govern-
mental officials or political parties or party officials; "essentially
ministerial or clerical" employees were excluded on this basis.62 The essen-
tial distinction was that gratuities were permitted, in principle, to minor
officials for the purpose of speeding up theoretically mandatory action.63
This exception again blunted extraterritorial reach.
The Ford Administration argued prudence and realism, preferring dis-
closure to the Secretary of Commerce without criminalization and then
patient international negotiations. Senators William Proxmire, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and
Frank Church, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-
tions, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, disdained the disclosure
approach.64 Congress gave short shrift to the proposed alternative
approach of the Ford Administration. 65
In principle, the disclosure approach would compel reporting of all
payments made directly or indirectly "to any other individual or entity in
connection with: An official action, or sale to or contract with a foreign
government, for the commercial benefit" of the payer or payer's foreign
affiliate.66 The Secretary of Commerce would issue rules and regulations
for reporting and would receive investigatory authority. 67 Fines would
apply to failure to report, failure to maintain required records, and negli-
gent omission or falsification of required information.68 Knowing falsifica-
tion would be subjected to fine and imprisonment for individuals and fine
for legal entities.69 While the proposal included provisions for dissemina-
tion of reports within the government and, one year after receipt, to the
62. See Bryan W. Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of
Corruption in Third-World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHics Q. 17, 20-21 (1994) (explaining how
bribes are made in Mexico to expedite issuance of driver's licenses).
63. Id.
64. Senator Proxmire, the chief driver of the 1977 FCPA, stated:
I just cannot understand under these circumstances, in view of the fact that we
say bribes are not necessary or material to the success of a business, and in
every industry we have had success without paying bribes, why not outlaw
it.... It was just wrong for a corporation to pay bribes. We ought to outlaw it
and be done with it. Certainly we should outlaw ... payments that are illegal
under the laws of the foreign country.
Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379, S. 3418 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 5, 5-6, 16 (1976)
(statement of William Proxmire, Chairman).
65. See Foreign Payments Disclosure Act, S. 3741, 94th Cong. (1976), reprinted in
GRaEAu'.s & WINDSOR, supra note 50, at 163-68.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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public, this proposal was subjected to exceptions in which the Secretary of
State found "foreign policy interests" and the Attorney General found
"investigation or prosecution" interests.70 In theory at least, the two cabi-
net officers could prevent publication of all reports. The two cabinet
officers would be authorized to furnish information to foreign govern-
ments and foreign law enforcement authorities. The regulations to be
issued by the Secretary of Commerce would "include the name of every
recipient who receives anything of value over a specified amount and the
amount received by each such recipient," and the possible loophole for
multiple payments for a single transaction was addressed.71 Other statutes
and the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would
not be affected by the proposal. 72
It can be argued that a fully implemented disclosure approach might
haye had a similar chilling effect on U.S. corporate bribery, but operating
on the demand rather than on the supply side. In other words, who would
engage in corrupt dealings with U.S. firms where such dealings would be
public information within a year? Presumably something like the FCPA
reporting and internal accounting control procedures would have been nec-
essary. The main difference could have been to avoid supply-side criminal-
ization of payments. The Ford Administration's motive was to temporize,
likely for a number of reasons, while international diplomacy worked
slowly on the matter.73
While there was relatively little organized opposition to passage of the
1977 FCPA, it subsequently was subjected to considerable criticism on
various grounds, and there was a continuing effort by Republican legisla-
tors to effect amendments to the statute, without attempting to reverse
criminal prohibition of enterprise bribery. In general terms, there were
efforts to reduce the alleged chilling effect of the FCPA on U.S. business
endeavors abroad by softening legal standards for knowledge of illegal con-
duct by foreign agents. This and other changes were intended to reduce the
burden of compliance, provide shareholder's right of action and private
right of action, and instruct the President to work for international agree-
ments.74 These efforts eventually resulted in amendment of the FCPA by
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA). 75
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. The Ribicoff Resolution, S. Res. 265, 94th Cong. (1975), introduced by Senator
Ribicoff's Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, called for international
negotiations within the GATT framework and other appropriate international forums.
See Slade, supra note 47, at 127. In March 1976, the United States submitted a proposal
for an international agreement to the Lima, Peru session of the U.N. Commission on
Transnational Corporations. See id. at 128. The U.N. Economic and Social Council in
August 1976 adopted Resolution 2041 (LXI) to establish a working group to begin elabo-
rating an international agreement. The Draft International Agreement on Illicit Pay-
ments was submitted by the working group to ECOSOC in May 1979. See id. at 129.
75. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-148,
102 Stat. 1415.
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New affirmative defenses to the FCPA, as amended in 1988 (1988
FCPA), permitted payments to government officials when (a) "lawful under
the written laws and regulations" of the host country, or (b) "a reasonable
and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses" for pro-
motion or contract performance. 76 The Attorney General was instructed
statutorily to provide clarification through guidelines, voluntary precau-
tionary procedures, and issuance of opinions responding to specific inquir-
ies by issuers and domestic concerns. 7 7 Submissions to the Attorney
General could be considered by a court and were specifically exempted
from public disclosure. The term "routine governmental action" was illus-
trated by examples. 78
The President was instructed to seek international cooperation and to
report on progress within one year of enactment.7 9 The 1988 FCPA was
further amended in 1998 during implementation of the OECD Conven-
tion.80 The Secretary of Commerce was instructed to report to Congress
by July 1, 1999, and each of the five succeeding years, on implementation
of the OECD Convention.
The effectiveness of the FCPA is not the crucial consideration. The
1977 FCPA arguably involved both hasty policymaking and poor legislative
drafting. Such problems might reasonably be handled by amendment, as
discussed above, and relaxed enforcement.8 1
Steven Salbu concludes that U.S. enforcement of the FCPA has been
historically lax.8 2 Rather, the essential matter is whether criminal prohibi-
tion, or even mandatory disclosure, should have been undertaken at all.
Other advanced democracies were well aware of the post-Watergate revela-
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 53 Fed. Reg. 779 (1988) (delegating these functions
to the Secretary of State).
80. See International Anti-Bribery and Fait Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302. Some refinements in definitions were substituted, and a sub-
section was added concerning "Alternative Jurisdiction." The term "foreign official" was
defined in more detail to include public international organizations, with particular
attention to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization and the Inter-
national Mobile Satellite Organization established pursuant to multilateral conventions.
The statute was effectively broadened so as to prohibit improper action outside the
United States and irrespective of whether mails or interstate commerce were employed.
In effect, extraterritoriality was strengthened.
81. See Salbu, supra note 49, at 231.
82. See id. A number of prosecutions have been undertaken, and even recently alle-
gations of bribery by U.S. firms have been made. See id. Low reports some 40 criminal
prosecutions under the anti-bribery provisions and 33 Department of Justice public
opinions. Low et al., supra note 48, at 270. Lockheed admitted a bribe of $1 million to
facilitate aircraft sales in Egypt and settled for a combined civil and criminal fine of
$24.8 million-double the profits, the largest ever imposed under the law and the first
case in which company officials received prison terms. See id. at 260; Salbu, supra note
49, at 237. The SEC proceeded against an Italian firm, Montedison, S.P.A., that traded
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange, for falsified
reports over several years to hide an estimated $400 million in bribes occurring entirely
in Italy. See Low et al., supra note 48, at 263 n.73.
Cornell International Law Journal
tions and it required no stretch of imagination to understand that similar
bribery by other countries was being revealed. Those countries, with the
exception of Sweden, opted to neglect the issue, leaving the United States
acting unilaterally.
The lead author addressed the matter somewhat differently in 1982.83
Haste and groupthink do not necessarily make bad legislation, but they are
very likely to produce a situation in which legislation occurs without the
foundation of what the lead author then termed a "coherent theory."8 4 In
testimony, John J. McCloy, chairman of the Gulf Oil special review commit-
tee and an old hand at international relations, stated:
I suggest before any legislation is adopted or... recommended by any com-
mittee of Congress, the whole subject of political contributions and pay-
ments, whether here or abroad, should be more thoroughly examined. I
think it is much too early to rush to statutory remedies before the whole case
is in and all the factors weighed.85
II. Some Empirical Evidence
The two key complaints raised against the FCPA involve, first, the moral
imperialism of its extraterritoriality and, second, the economic conse-
quences for U.S. businesses. The FCPA was not, however, the result of an
organized political drive mounted over time. It was a decade before the
United States moved seriously on international collaboration, as distinct
from U.N. endorsement in principle, and another decade before such col-
laboration, in preliminary and theoretical form, could be crafted. The
costs of delay arguably affected other countries than the United States
through the damages imposed by corruption.
A charge of moral imperialism suggests that the matter at hand is
dearly one of local option.86 However, facilitating payments, gifts, and
gratuities in narrow form are recognized in the FCPA as different from
bribes. The assertion of extraterritorial imperialism should thus be soft-
ened, at least prior to the 1988 amendments that moved the United States
officially into pressuring OAS and OECD member nations for multilateral
action. If a charge of imperialism is accurate, then the charge applies
equally to the OECD with respect to the rest of the world. Whether the
83. See GREANAs AND WiwnsoR, supra note 50, at 133-51.
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id. at 134 (citing Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the
U.S. Senate, Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 5 (1976) (state-
ment of John J. McCloy).
86. See Elaine Sternberg, The Universal Principles of Business Ethics, in BusiNEss ETH-
ICS IN THE GLOBAL MARKEU 1 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1999). Sternberg explicates the gen-
eral case for ethical universalism in international trade relying upon shareholder value
maximization within principles of distributive justice and ordinary decency. See id., see
also Robert W. McGee, Minimal Ethical and Legal Absolutes in Foreign Trade, in BusiNEss
ETHIcs IN THE GLOBAL MARM=T, supra, at 63. McGee explicates the general case for mini-
mal ethical and legal absolutes in international trade relying upon individual rights
being superior to utilitarianism such that government should not interfere in voluntary
contracts unless such rights are violated. See McGee, supra.
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FCPA handles the gift distinction adequately can always be questioned, but
the basic issue is recognized. Legislation could simply ban all gifts outside
a proper business contract., although the next matter becomes soft extor-
tion in the form of community benefits under the guise of corporate social
responsibility.8 7 Trivial amounts close to the line can in principle be
ignored in favor of cultural diversity arguments. 88 However, a global anti-
corruption campaign may simply sweep away such distinctions, and they
may not even exist in the domestic legislation of some OAS or OECD mem-
ber nations.
Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee may supply a reasonable gen-
eral approach for addressing the matter.8 9 They distinguish between (1)
"global hypernorms" universally applicable as natural, or inherent, rights
of human beings, and (2) other "integrative social contracts" in which
norms within voluntary moral communities are determined by mutual con-
sent.90 One may visualize two nested circles, the inner circle labeled
global hypernorms, or macrosocial contracts, and the outer circle labeled
microsocial contracts, or local moral communities. The outer circle does
not constitute a moral community unless it abides by the global
hypernorms. Voluntary contracts cannot violate the natural rights of
human beings who, by extension, cannot properly contract away their
rights. Local custom may be wrong, and, whether right or wrong, it may
nevertheless be wrong to impose local custom on foreigners. Donaldson
and Dunfee provide a list of proposed global hypernorms.
The next issue is then whether the democratic countries, or at least
one of them, can and ought to defend global hypernorms everywhere. At a
minimum, the democratic countries should not actively support violation
of global hypernorms. A multilateral campaign against bribery and extor-
tion is not one of the listed global hypernorms. It is difficult to believe,
however, that the hypernorms are fully effective in a society ruled by a
highly corrupt officialdom. Sen emphasizes that individual freedom is the
goal of development and also the effective agency, through market and
democratic institutions, for development. 9 1
It is unlikely that corrupt officials rule with the consent of the people,
unless the people benefit more from the corruption than from honest gov-
ernment of honorable officials. The nature of corruption is that it is secret
87. See Business Ethics: Hard Graft in Asia, EcONOMIST, May 1995, at 61 (contrasting
the term "soft extortion" with "hard graft").
88. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (1991).
89. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 AcAD. MGMTrr. REv. 252, 252-67
(1994). Elsewhere Dunfee states that "hypernorms are defined as norms so fundamen-
tal to human existence that they will be reflected in a convergence of religious, political,
and philosophical thought. Hypernorms thus represent core or fundamental values
common to many cultures." Thomas W. Dunfee, The Role of Ethics in International Busi-
ness, in BusINEss ETHICS: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONoMy 63, 69 (Thomas W. Dunfee &
Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993).
90. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 89, at 252-62.
91. See SEN, supra note 38, at xii.
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and self-interested and hence unlikely to be shared with the people. Sen
criticizes the argument for cultural diversity with respect to this considera-
tion: "The so-called Asian values that are invoked to justify authoritarian-
ism are not especially Asian in any significant sense. . . .The case for
liberty and political rights turns ultimately on their basic importance and
on their instrumental role. This case is as strong in Asia as it is
elsewhere." 92
Corruption, whether by public officials or others, is socially imper-
missible deviance from some public duty or more generally some ideal
standard of conduct.93 Bribery is misuse of a public office for personal
gain.94 Extortion is demanding something of value under threat of damage
in some form to the payer, if only the loss of a potential gain. The line
between bribery and extortion may be a very thin one, 95 as also that
between corruption and networking.96 One might understandably con-
flate corruption with side-payments, or gifts, among individuals or multi-
part tariffs, such as gratuities.
Leaving aside whether such practices are themselves proper, the chief
distinction lies in the combinations of secrecy, violation of some defined
duty, and official abuse of position or monopoly power that characterize
supply-side bribery and demand-side extortion as forms of corruption.
Gifts and gratuities are different in principle from full-blown corruption;
however, their customary practice and expectation could become the basis
for corruption. 97
Empirical data concerning the incidence and consequences of these
various segments of bribery and corruption are notoriously difficult to col-
lect and validate. Generally speaking, only poor and typically impression-
istic information is available. Bribery and extortion are by nature secret
92. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, in BUSINESS EHics IN THE GLOBAL
MARKET, supra note 86, at 61; See also Seita, supra note 22, at 448 ("All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.").
93. See Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization,
18 J.L. & ECON. 587, 587-609 (1975).
94. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 257.
95. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From
the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815 (1988).
96. See Salbu, supra note 49, at 250.
97. The essential distinctions are that a gift is without "quid pro quo" unlike the key
aspect of a bribe and is also immaterial, although such gifts may in reality be minor
extractions. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 278 n.117 (citing DON
ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CoRRuPr PRACCES ACT 6-19 (1995)). An
important aspect of Nichols's critique of customary gifts is that systemic corruption
involves a "creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions" that slowly erodes
political legitimacy in a society. Id. at 274 n.92 (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 102 (1997)). Salim Rashid has
argued that telephone service bribes in India began as price discrimination among cus-
tomers in an officially egalitarian system-with inadequate capacity-and rapidly deteri-
orated into extortion practiced against all customers that impeded service to extract
larger bribes. See id. at 278 n.117 (citing Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian
LDCs: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34 Kynaos: INT'L REV. FOR SOC.
ScI. 448, 448-55 (1981)); see also Jeffrey A. Fadiman, A Traveler's Guide to Gifts and
Bribes, 64 HAv. Bus. REv. 122, 122-26, 130-36 (1986).
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and deliberately concealed acts.98 In this respect, the FCPA possibly
retarded acquisition of information concerning corruption relative to the
Ford Administration's disclosure strategy.99
The authors suggest, for present purposes, that global corruption is
roughly a pyramid of three levels-each level likely successively larger in
nominal dollar volume. At the top of the pyramid is (1) business bribery of
foreign officials, paid largely but not exclusively by enterprises of advanced
countries to largely but not exclusively officials of developing, emergent,
and transition countries; next is (2) money laundering, especially of illegal
drug trafficking receipts, occurring largely in the advanced countries; and,
at the base, is (3) domestic political and commercial corruption, which
occurs in many countries, but is endemic and perhaps increasingly epi-
demic in developing, emergent, and transition areas. TI has published Cor-
ruption Perception Index information by country since 1995, gradually
expanding its list of covered nations, and also has recently begun, in 1999,
a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) for a restricted set of nineteen countries. The
CPI information roughly captures all three levels of corruption identified
here; the BPI information addresses solely the first level-business bribery
of foreign officials.
A. The Incidence of Corruption
Nora Rubin states that "[tihere is no proof that corruption is more preva-
lent now than ever before in history."100 However, international conscious-
ness and concern have dearly risen.101 The incidence of corruption in
various forms in the developing and transition economies in particular has
increased over the last decade and become more pervasive. 10 2 The sugges-
tion appears roughly true in former communist states of Central and East-
ern Europe where, although a black market operated before 1991,
economic chaos and widespread criminal corruption has followed.
10 3
98. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 272 ("Quantitative treatment of
bribery is virtually impossible: bribery is illegal in every country in the world and is
thus chronically difficult to observe. Therefore, anecdotal, nonquantitative data must be
used.").
99. The authors' reasoning holds that at least under the disclosure approach, infor-
mation theoretically would be filed with the U.S. government even if subsequently held
from publication for some period of time. Corrupt payments would not be stopped, but
rather be made subject to reporting that would subsequently undergo facilitated analy-
sis. Prohibition arguably drove some corruption further underground, so that the extent
of practice worldwide was more deeply concealed. The authors suggest that TI's CPI and
BPI data for the United States, see infra tbl.1, and infra tbl.2, reveal that the 1997 FCPA
has not necessarily improved the U.S. reputation for clean dealing.
100. Rubin, supra note 20, at 261-62.
101. See id. at 262.
102. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1275 n.7, 1278 n.18.
103. SeeJEFFRE P. BRAos & G oEGORY HussIsA, THE FoREIGN Coiuwvr PRACrnCES AcT:
COPING Wrr CoiuPnoN IN TRANSmON ECONOMIES (1996); Daniel Kaufman & Paul
Siegelbaum, Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies, 50 J. Irr' AFr. 419,
419-58 (1996); see also Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What Is To Be Done?, 33 COR-
NELL INT'L I.J. 483 (2000).
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Bribes sometimes include an additional payment amount intended to
establish or strengthen monopolies in host countries, thereby disadvantag-
ing foreign business rivals. 104 A World Bank survey of 3600 firms in sixty-
nine countries found that forty percent pay bribes.10 5 There are sugges-
tions that the going rate has risen from ten to thirty percent, with twenty
percent being usual.106
Transparency International's CPI is a "poll of polls" that combines
various surveys conducted among businesspersons concerning their per-
ceptions of corruption by country. The CPI is an eleven-point scale, with
zero being "entirely penetrated by corruption involving immense sums of
kickbacks, extortion, fraud, etc." and ten being entirely clean-free of cor-
ruption.10 7 Variance among the surveys is combined and is reported in
addition to the average point estimate.
The BPI is a newly established surveys, conducted in fourteen leading
emerging market economies, intended to show the bribe-paying propensi-
ties of businesspersons from nineteen leading exporting countries.108 The
BPI was initiated in response to criticisms that the CPI inappropriately
emphasized bribe-receiving countries. The BPI is also reported as an
eleven-point scale, with a zero indicating great willingness to pay bribes
and a ten signifying a corruption-free exporting country. Such CPI and
BPI data are impressionistic and based on opinion surveys of presumably
knowledgeable individuals.
The authors compared the 1998 and 1999 CPI point estimates by
country and categorized the reported countries into deciles greater than
1.0, equal to or greater than 2.0, and so on through equal to or greater than
the 9.0 level. The reported countries were also categorized into economic
types or geographical locations: OECD advanced economies; emergent
economies important to the OECD as a whole; transition economies of for-
merly communist Central and Eastern Europe, some of the new OECD
countries; Latin America and Caribbean countries; Sub-Saharan Africa;
Asia; and a few Arab countries. The CPI included eighty-five countries in
1998 and ninety-nine in 1999. Coverage was expanded in Central and
Eastern Europe. Where the country was not included in 1998, the single
point estimate was used from 1999. Where a country's two scores crossed
categories, the simple average was used for assignment.
104. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1280.
105. See id. at 1277. The proportion was 15% in industrial countries and 60% in the
former USSR. See id. at 1277 n.12 (citing Thomas Omestad et al., Bye-Bye to Bribes, U.S.
NEws & WoRLD REP., Dec. 22, 1997, at 39, 42).
106. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1278-80.
107. TI website, supra note 1.
108. The reported standard error was 0.2% or less. The 14 leading emerging coun-
tries-accounting for more than 60% of total imports of all "emerging market" econo-
mies, as defined for purposes of the TI study-were: (a) Asia: India, Indonesia,
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand; (b) Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia; (c)
Transition Europe: Hungary, Poland, Russia; and (d) Africa: Morocco, Nigeria, South
Africa. (The authors use a different, more restrictive, definition of "emerging." See infra
tbl.1.
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The resulting classification is reported in Table 1. The authors suggest
that a ranking below 7.0 is reasonable evidence of propensity for domestic
corruption. The resulting distribution shows OECD advanced economies
positioned toward the relatively dean end with a scattering of countries
perceived to be relatively more corrupt; and all other economies largely
positioned toward the highly corrupt end with a scattering of countries
perceived to be relatively more dean. Although we hesitate to conclude
directly that economic advancement reduces corruption, the emergent
economies tend to be less corrupt than the developing countries. However,
it is not clear whether economic advancement reduces corruption or cor-
ruption impedes economic advancement. Our own view is that corruption
hinders development. One may interpolate that the distribution suggests
that democratic polities, which correlate generally with market economies,
are relatively cleaner.
A few OECD advanced economies had corruption-prone reputations:
France, above 6; Japan and Belgium, above 5; and Italy, above 4. The
United States, together with Austria, Germany, and Ireland, fell between 7
and 8. Among emergent countries, Portugal and Spain, both EU and
OECD members, and Israel, fell above 6; Taiwan and South Korea, above 5;
Greece, an EU and OECD member, above 4; and Turkey, an EU associate
member and an OECD member, above 3. Outside the OECD, a few coun-
tries may rank above 5, but the bulk fall below 4. Only Singapore scored
above 9 and Hong Kong above 7. The most corrupt countries, those scor-
ing below 2, were Nigeria, Cameroon, Indonesia, Paraguay, Honduras,
Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. Developing countries with large populations
are typically rated as very corrupt.
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Table 1.
Categorization of Countries Using TI Average 1998-1999 CPI Scores' 0 9
Category Advanced Emergent Transition Latin America Sub-Saharan Asia Arab
Countries Countries Countries & Caribbean Africa World
(All OECD
Members)
> 1.0 Uzbekistan* Paraguay Nigeria Indonesia
Azerbaijan* Honduras Cameroon
> 2.0 Yugoslavia Colombia Ivory Coast India
Russia Venezuela Uganda Vietnam
Croatia* Bolivia Kenya Pakistan
Albania* Ecuador
Georgia*
Krygyz Rep.*
Kazazhstan*
Moldava*
Ukraine
Armenia*
> 3.0 Turkey Macedonia* El Salvador Mozambique* Philippines Morocco
Lithuania Jamaica Zambia China Egypt
Slovak Rep. Mexico Senegal Thailand
Belarus Nicaragua Ghana
Latvia Argentina
Bulgaria
> 4.0 Italy Greece Czech Rep. Peru Malawi Mongolia* Jordan
Poland Uruguay Zimbabwe Mauritius
Brazil
> 5.0 Japan Taiwan Estonia Costa Rica Namibia Malaysia Tunisia
Belgium S. Korea Hungary S. Africa
> 6.0 France Portugal Slovenia* Chile Botswana
Spain
Israel
5 7.0 Austria Hong Kong
U.S.
Germany
Ireland
* 8.0 Switzerland
Luxembourg
Australia
U.K
_ Norway
* 9.0 Denmark Singapore
Finland
Sweden
Iceland
New Zealand
Canada
Netherlands
CPI and BPI scores are not directly comparable by country, since the
data are collected from very different sources for very different purposes.
But the scores shown in Table 2 suggest that a BPI below 6.0 is reasonable
109. See Transparency Int'l, The 1999 Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) (1999) <http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/1999/
index.html#cpi>. CPI scores range from 0, signifying that a nation is considered very
corrupt, to 10, signifying the opposite. An asterisk (*) denotes datum comprising only a
1999 score.
2000 Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption
evidence of propensity to bribe foreign officials for business purposes and
also that the rough average difference between CPI and BPI indices is about
the 1.0 level. This difference corresponds closely to the CPI-BPI differ-
ence for Sweden,110 Canada, and Switzerland, which do not change rank
order in this comparison and remain at the top end of the table. In com-
parison, South Korea and China do not move much at all between CPI and
BPI scores at the bottom end of the table. Table 2 rank orders the nineteen
countries included in the 1999 BPI report, which groups Hong Kong with
China, according to the 1999 CPI of each country.
Both a CPI-BPI difference and the change in rank order from CPI to
BPI listing are computed and shown. Despite the difference in CPI and BPI
scores, a higher reported CPI-ten being clean-roughly corresponds to a
higher reported BPI-again, with ten being clean. Naturally, some coun-
tries had relatively higher or lower CPI relative to BPI scores within this
general pattern. Generally, the expected countries fall at the extreme ends
of both indices. Of course, very few non-OECD countries are rated in the
BPI report. Two key shifts in perception occur between the CPI and BPI
"respondents." Belgium's BPI score was considerably greater than its CPI
score. Singapore's BPI score was greatly lower than its CPI score and repre-
sented the largest shift. Italy's BPI score was lower than its CPI score, as
was the case also for Taiwan. However, Italy's situation directly matches
the postulated 1.0 downward shift from CPI to BPI score, while Taiwan's
shift is roughly double that size. The United States and Germany each fell
a rank order position while Australia and Austria gained considerably in
rank order position.
110. Bofors of Sweden was involved in an arms sale bribery scandal in India. See
Letters to the Editor: Bribery Apologia Sells Asians Morally Short, WALL ST. J., June 17,
1996, at A15.
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Table 2.
Comparison of the 1999 TI CPI and BPI for Nineteen Countries1 11
Domestic Corruption
Corruption Abroad
Corruption Difference Change
Perception Bribe Payers CPI-BPI in Rank
Index 1999 Index 1999 1999 1999
Index Rank Index Rank
Relatively Clean: Above 7.0 CPI and Above 6.0 BPI
Sweden 9.4 1 8.3 1 -1.1 0
Canada 9.2 2 8.2 2 -1.0 0
Netherlands 9.0 4 7.4 6 -1.6 -2
Switzerland 8.9 5 7.7 5 -1.2 0
Australia 8.7 6 8.1 3 -0.6 +3
United Kingdom 8.6 7 7.2 7 -1.4 0
Germany 8.0 8 6.2 9 -1.8 -1
Austria 7.6 9 8.1 4 +0.5 +5
United States 7.5 10 6.2 9 -0.7 -1
Countries With Reversed CPI and BPI Relationships
Belgium 15.31151 6.8 81 +1.5 +7
Singapore 9.1 3 5.7 11 -3.4 -8
Relatively Corrupt: Below 7.0 CPI and Below 6.0 BPI
France 6.6 11 5.2 13 -1.4 -2
Spain 6.6 11 5.3 12 -1.3 -1
Japan 6.0 13 5.1 14 -0.9 -1
Taiwan 5.6 14 3.5 17 -2.1 -3
Malaysia 5.1 16 3.9 15 +1.2 +1
Italy 4.7 17 3.7 16 -1.0 +1
South Korea 3.8 18 3.4 18 -0.4 0
China 3.4 19 3.1 19 -0.3 0
B. The Effects of Corruption on Political Institutions and Civil Society
For political institutions and civil society, bribery and extortion create
three related costs: such corruption (1) is anti-democratic; (2) spreads to
infect whole societies with a sense of fatalism; and (3) has direct and
immediate effects on people's safety, especially during natural disasters.
First, bribery is anti-democratic. Donaldson has argued that the right
to political participation is a fundamental human right, regardless of
nationality. 11 2 A public official who fails to act in the larger public interest
111. See Transparency Int'l, The Transparency International Bribe-Payers['] Survey(1999) <http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/bps.html>; supra note 109. CPI
and BPI indices run from zero, very corrupt, to ten, very clean.
112. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHics OF IwrmiATioNAL BusiNEss 81-94 (1989).
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because of a bribe payment has disrupted democracy and political partici-
pation. As OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria commented: "Corruption
deprives us all: our governments of their legitimate functions; our citizens
of their resources and rights; and the international commerce of its balance
and transparency."'1 3 Even in societies where corruption is widespread
and apparently accepted, the population that suffers from its effects does
not prefer it. Oscar Arias Sanchez, former President of Costa Rica and
Nobel Peace Prize recipient, catalogued a list of abuses attributable to cor-
ruption: former Ivory Coast president-for-life Houphouet-Boigny built a
monumental cathedral amidst a sea of poverty; in the former Burma, a
repressive army deals heroin to finance its grip on power; in Latin America,
many dictators have justified their governments by pointing fingers at cor-
rupt regimes of the past, while depriving citizens of the legal resources
necessary to expose the corruption. 114 The immediate effects of corrup-
tion include the destruction of democratic institutions.
Second, corruption tends to spread, infecting large groups of people
and whole societies with widespread moral decay and fatalism and result-
ing in hopelessness and inaction. Corruption in the poorest countries can
become self-sustaining when citizens lack the energy to be outraged by the
corrupt actions of government officials. In addition, corruption can
"trickle down" 15 so that "grand" corruption by high-level officials is mir-
rored in "petty" corruption by low-level officials, and corruption pervades
both the public and private sectors.
Third, corruption leads to improper construction of infrastructure,
which is easily destroyed in the event of natural disaster. For example,
Hurricane Mitch, which hit Honduras, Nicaragua, and other Central Amer-
ican countries in 1998, resulted in widespread death and destruction out
of proportion with the strength of the hurricane itself. Part of the reason is
that the infrastructure of those countries had not been adequately con-
structed, due largely to corruption. Furthermore, reconstruction was
stalled due to corruption. Disaster relief funds "poured into" the region,
while no significant progress was made with reconstruction. 116
C. The Economic Consequences of Corruption
Mahoney predicts that a "commercial and political renaissance" will result
from the suppression of corruption. 117 A short-term case can be made
for 1 8 and a long-term case can be made against 1 9 bribery in developing
113. TI NEWSL. (Transparency Int'l), Sept. 1994, at 4.
114. See Oscar Arias Sanchez, Open Session, in OECD SYMPOSIUM ON CORRUPTION AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE 13 (1996).
115. See Wangari Maathai, Speech at the 9th Annual International Anti-Corruption
Conference in Durban, South Africa, in TI NEWSL. (Transparency Int'l), Dec. 1999, at 4.
116. See The Americas, TI NEWSL. (Transparency Int'l), Dec. 1999, at 13.
117. J. Mahoney, Ethical Attitudes to Bribery and Extortion, in WHOSE BUSINESS VAL-
UES?: SoME ASIAN AND CROss-CuLTuRAL PmEspEcrrwas 235 (S. Stewart & G. Donleavy eds.,
1995).
118. See Rubin, supra note 201 citing SAMUE. P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SocIwnEs 68, 69 (1969); Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, 107 FOR-
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countries. The short-term case for bribery is that it copes with existing
resource shortages, distorted markets, and administrative incompetence
and is relatively limited in both scope and consequences. 120 Paulo Mauro,
an IMF economist, found that corruption reduced private investment and
thus the rate of economic growth. 121 The negative association was statisti-
cally and economically significant. Quantitatively, a decrease in existing
corruption might raise the ratio of investment to GDP by almost 4% and
the annual growth of GDP per capita by almost 0.5%.122 For example,
despite the Nigerian oil boom, which contributed about eighty percent of
Nigeria's total revenues during the period from 1983 to 1992, per capita
GNP declined from $770 to $320.123 The most reasonable explanation for
this situation is Nigeria's high level of corruption. A Russian study found
corruption increased food vendor prices fifteen to twenty percent. 124 In
Vietnam, graft was estimated at a ten to twenty percent surcharge on con-
EIGN POL'Y 114, 114-18 (1997); Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. Rev. 417, 417-27 (1967); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Corruption and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT Eco-
NOMICS 1997 35, 36-42 (Boris Pleskovic &Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1997).
119. See M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy
of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441 (1989); David H. Bayley, The Effects of
Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719 (1966); Scott F. Boylan, Organized
Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 1999 (1996); Ronald H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22
J.L. & EcoN. 269 (1979); Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Gov-
ernment, With Special Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYiaos: INT'L REV. FOR
Soc. Sci. 47 (1975); Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121 (1996); Robert Klitgaard, Cleaning Up and
Invigorating the Civil Service, 17 PUB. ADMIN. & Dev. 487 (1997); Ndiva Kofele-Kale,
Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 45 (1995); Nathaniel Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic
Corruption, 8 AM. BE-Av. Scirs'r 8 (1964); Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global
Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y 55 (1996); Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third-
World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case, 39 WORLD POL. 508 (1987); Robert
Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South
India, 18 J. DEv. STUD. 287 (1982); Robert Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the
Indian State Is Not Better at Development, 13 WORLD Day. 467 (1985).
120. See Rashid, supra note 97, at 448-55 (describing bribe payments in India to
obtain telephone lines and both overseas and domestic calls); see also Nichols, Regulat-
ing Bribery, supra note 8, at 271 n.77. One can analogize the interpretation as a three-
part tariff in telecommunications: basic monthly rate, long-distance or other usage rate,
and additional payment for more rapid connection. The additional payment, however,
goes to private parties in violation of their formal duties on behalf of the government.
121. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Qj. EcoN. 681, 700-04 (1995).
122. See Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Govern-
ment Expenditure: A Cross Country Analysis, in CORauRPION AND THE GLOBaL ECONOMY 83,
91 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1996).
123. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1292 (citing Threat to U.S. Trade and Finance from
Drug Trafficking and International Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control & the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the
Committee on Finance, 104th Cong. 45, 45-46 (1996) (testimony of Robet S. Leiken)). It
is estimated that bribery amounted to $100 billion in Venezuela over the preceding 20
years. See id. at 1277 n.12 (citing Omestad et al., supra note 105, at 44).
124. See id. at 1287 (citing Almond & Syfert, supra note 20, at 434).
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sumer goods prices.1 25
Wei examined the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment
(FDI) using two different survey data sources, including TI's CPI, which
provided a sample of fourteen source and forty-five host countries during
1990-91.126 Wei treated corruption payments as equivalent to an increase
in the tax on corporate profits. Wei concluded that: (1) a rise in either
host-country tax rate or corruption level reduced inward FDI flows; (2)
corruption had the same effect on FDI into East Asian host countries as
elsewhere; and (3) U.S. investors, despite the FCPA, were no more averse to
corruption in host countries than average OECD investors. 12 7 The find-
ings are both statistically significant and economically large. Wei deter-
mined that the increase in corruption level from Singapore-very clean-to
Mexico-very corrupt-was equivalent to raising the effective corporate tax
rate by over twenty percent. Wei discovered "some weak support for the
hypothesis that Japanese investors may be somewhat less sensitive to cor-
ruption," but found no difference in U.S. versus Japanese investors con-
cerning East Asia.1 28
The World Bank estimates foreign bribery and related extortion at
roughly five percent of all FDI inflows and imports into developing coun-
tries. 129 The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption
estimated a three to five percent increase in bribes and grease payments
relative to operating costs. 130 In 1990, world exports destined for the
developing countries amounted to some $916 billion.13 ' In 1994, FDI to
the same regions amounted to some $91 billion. 132 In 1992, the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD member nations provided
some $115.8 billion in public and private aid to developing countries. 133
Adding these three figures together, inflows in roughly the early 1990s
amounted to just over a trillion dollars.
A minimum estimate will suffice for our purposes. At five percent, the
nominal value of corruption on foreign inflows could amount to some $50
billion. That amount is perhaps two-tenths of one percent of the gross
national product (GNP) of the industrial market economies, but 1.5% of
world exports originate in those economies. 134 Rubin estimates the scale
at almost $80 billion annually. 135 The GNP outside the industrial market
125. See id. at 1287 n.84.
126. See SHANG-JIN WEI, How TAXING IS CORRUPTION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS?
(National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6030, 1997).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1.
129. See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 9-10 (Sept. 1997) (cited in Rubin, supra note 20, at 259 n.2).
130. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1287 (citing Almond and Syfert, supra note 20, at
434).
131. See PRESTON & WINDSOR, supra note 27, at 227.
132. See id. at 41-42.
133. See id. at 118 n.7 (based on U.S. Department of Commerce 1995 data).
134. See supra note 27.
135. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 259 n.2 (basing this analysis on World Bank data);
see also WORLD BANK, supra note 129.
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economies, which is roughly the aggregate of developing, emergent, and
transitional economies together, amounted to an estimated $5.3 trillion in
1993.136 If the inflows are subtracted to yield crudely GDP of perhaps $4
trillion or a little more, then domestic corruption would amount to another
$200 billion at a similar estimate of five percent. These crude estimates are
hardly scientifically reliable, but they yield a rough sense of the likely mini-
mum scale of the problem.
D. Economic Losses Suffered by the United States Due to the FCPA
A first mover may suffer losses rather than gain relative advantages. Given
the reality of global bribery, "the risk that U.S. business activities abroad
will be subject to criminal penalties in the United States, while their com-
petitors in ... other countries operate under no similar legal constraint,
has greatly complicated the participation of U.S. citizens and companies in
the global economy."137 Since enforcement has arguably been lax, esti-
mates of what overall effect the FCPA has had on preventing bribery by
U.S. firms are difficult. However, the FCPA evidently receives serious cor-
porate attention. 138
The evidence concerning U.S. business losses is mixed and difficult to
interpret. Some firms cite losses; other firms cite gains and other advan-
tages. The circumstances likely vary by industry, firm, and host country.
Kate Gillespie concluded that FCPA harm to U.S. exports is unproved. 139
Paul Beck and others found a statistically significant but economically
small effect of corruption on U.S. export competitiveness. 140 Richardson
reported that the FCPA regulatory burden was generally unimportant.' 4 '
Almost immediately under the Carter Administration, however, doubts
arose about the economic consequences of the FCPA. President Carter, in
September 1978, directed the Attorney General to provide written gui-
dance. The White House Export Disincentive Task Force concluded that,
during a one-year period, the FCPA cost the United States $1 billion annu-
ally in lost trade opportunities. 142 A GAO Report found that many busi-
nesspersons believed they had lost business due to the FCPA and that costs
136. See Preston & Windsor, supra note 27, at 35.
137. David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a
New International Legal Consensus, J. INr'L. L. & Bus. 457, 457-58 (1998).
138. Only 4.1% of surveyed respondents reported they had paid or authorized bribes;
44.6% rated the FCPA as a "very important" or "extremely important" factor affecting
U.S. export trade. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8, at 286 nn.156-59 (citing
JYOTi N. PRAsAD, IMPACT of THE FOREIGN CORRuPT PRAcncEs ACT OF 1977 ON U.S.
ExPoRTs 121, 141 (1993)).
139. See Kate Gillespie, Middle East Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
29 CAL. MGMT. REv. 9, 28 (1987).
140. See Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S.
Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 301 (1991).
141. SeeJ. DAVID RICHARDSON, SIZING Up U.S. EXPORT INCENTIVES 131 (Institute for Int'l
Econ., 1993), cited in WEI, supra note 126, at 5.
142. See Slade, supra note 47, at 118 (citing Philip Taubman, Carter Unit Recommends
Easing of Bribing Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1979, at D1, D15). The task force recom-
mended weakening and then abandoning FCPA. Senator Proxmire's protest prevented
the recommendations from being finalized and submitted to President Carter. See id.
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of compliance exceeded the Act's benefits. 14 3
Generally, the consensus of U.S. reports indicates some net loss of
national economic wealth. James Hines found that, after controlling for
growth of host-country GDP, corruption negatively affected the growth of
U.S. FDI during 1977-92, with particular emphasis on aircraft exports. 144
(The aircraft industry is essentially a competition between the United
States and the European consortium Airbus.) U.S. Trade Representative
Kantor estimated a loss of $64 billion in business in the 1996 calendar
year.' 45 The U.S. Department of Commerce valued alleged foreign bribery
in 180 commercial contracts over three years at an estimated $80 bil-
lion.146 The 1995 testimony of Secretary of Commerce Brown identified,
over time, 100 cases of bribery in deals worth $45 billion and in which the
bribers maintained an eighty percent success rate. 14 7
A prevailing U.S. presumption is that a level playing-field will elimi-
nate any FCPA disadvantages to U.S. firms. The presumption ignores the
economic and diplomatic costs of the transition to a corruption-free global
economy driven initially by the United States. Economic losses are not
automatically recoverable by future outcomes. As in the stock market, if
the average price of a portfolio drops, a loss is suffered, and the fact that,
six months later, the average price rises again does not mean that the loss
is recovered. Rather, the diminished opportunity to sell the portfolio in the
interim and invest the proceeds in some better opportunity is the relevant
consideration. If business opportunities have gone to another country, a
better playing-field in the future is no recompense-the gain must exceed
the loss.
Assuming a level of even $1 billion in losses annually, those losses
over some twenty-two years amount to $22 billion plus the economic multi-
plier effects; if multiplier effects are posited at five, the losses amount to at
least $100 billion. An annual loss of $5 billion, including multiplier
effects, is relatively trivial in relationship to GDP, though not necessarily so
in relationship to negative trade balance to which employment effects may
(citing Philip Taubman, Bribe Law is Defended in Congress: Idea of Easing it Angers Lead-
ers, N.Y. TimES, June 13, 1979, at D7).
143. See GENRAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON
U.S. BusINEsS: COMPTROLLER GENRAL's REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (1981), cited in Bar-
bara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery
Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the
Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 n.2 (1999).
144. SeeJames Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After
1977, (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), cited in Wai,
supra note 126, at 5.
145. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1277 n.11. (citing Patricia Digh, Shades of Gray in the
Global Marketplace, H.R. MAG., Apr. 1, 1997, at 91, 93).
146. See id. at 1278-79 (citing William Daley, Comment & Analysis: Clamping Down
on Commercial Bribery, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 1997, at 22).
147. See Letter From the President of the Fairfax Group, FAiRFAX BULL. (The Fairfax
Group, Ltd., Falls Church, Va.), Fall 1995. For more information regarding the Fairfax
Bulletin, including how to obtain a copy of this bulletin issue, contact them directly at
703-207-0600, or 800-967-9676.
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be traced. 148 The countervailing condition is that global economic growth
must increase sufficiently from corruption-free activities so that the United
States and other OECD countries will be better off in the long run, thus
offsetting the prior cost in addition to preventing future costs. Such
improvement measured in the aggregate does not address the earlier dis-
tributive effects on industries, firms, and individuals.
III. Evolution of a Multilateral Normative Regime
The authors examine, from the perspective of international regime theory,
the evolution of regional and global collaborations for combating bribery
and extortion1 49 An international policy regime is classically defined as
follows: "A regime is composed of sets of explicit or implicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expecta-
tions converge in a given area of international relations."' 50 Regimes are
fundamentally behavioral in character. 151 Formal institutional arrange-
ments and underlying, legitimizing principles may or may not exist. While
the term "regime" is also used as a synonym for "government," that mean-
ing is not intended here. Rather behavioral expectations substitute for gov-
ernment in the conventional sense.152 As Friedrich Kratochwil comments,
"norms" may be either explicit-that is, embodied in formal rules-or
implicit-evidenced only in behavior, and regimes are effectively "soft law"
lying between domestic "order" and international "anarchy."'153 Regimes,
in this behavioral and expectational sense, are "sets of rules of the game"
that guide interactions. 15 4
The authors distinguish between moral, or value-oriented, and norma-
tive, or behavior-oriented, regimes. A multilateral moral regime is a matter
of intrinsic commitment concerning global hypernorms and presupposes
either widespread value concurrence or value enforcement by a dominant
actor. A normative regime by contrast merely requires voluntary consent
148. Between 1983 and 1993, as the proportion of worldwide sales of U.S. multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) due to foreign affiliates rose from 27% to 31%, worldwide
employment of U.S. MNEs declined some 369,000, while foreign affiliate employment
rose by 348,000-implying a loss in U.S. parent employment of some 717,000. Affiliate
sales were most important in wholesale trade, petroleum, and service industries. See
PRESTON & WINDSOR, supra note 27, at 55.
149. See H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government's Cam-
paign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 407 (1999).
150. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see also Anne Drost &
Richard Brooks, Civil Society Regimes and Ecosystem Management: Selected Problems in
Lake Champlain, 15 Amz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 289 (1998).
151. For a critical view, see Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime
Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 150 at 337-54. Strange prefers a concep-
tion stressing "structures of power." Id.
152. See PRESTON & WINDSOR, supra note 27, at 16.
153. FRIEDRICH V. KRAToCIVwL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 12
(1989). "[M]arkets are probably the social institution most dependent on normative
underpinnings." Id. at 47.
154. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A
STATELESS SocimrY 3 (1994).
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or involuntary compliance concerning specific forms of behavior, without
respect to motives or attitudes. Participation need not be fully voluntary or
due to value concurrence without conflict of motives and interests. Such a
regime can operate reasonably effectively under a "rule of anticipated reac-
tions."'1 5 Toleration is both a necessary and a sufficient condition. Nor-
mative regimes resemble the Donaldson and Dunfee notion of local moral
communities, or micro-contracts, but moral values need not be at stake
other than rhetorically.15 6 A normative regime may address a value ques-
tion- for example, whether bribery and corruption are morally acceptable,
but it turns on a practical question, namely, whether bribery and extortion
are economically and politically tolerable. If suppression of corruption
falls under the rubric of global hypernorms it does so instrumentally; sup-
pression is instrumental to the achievement of the hypernorms.
The corruption-suppression conventions and policies represent the
beginnings of such a multilateral normative regime. The 1996 OAS and
1997 OECD Conventions and the 1997 EU Convention each constitute for-
mal consent, albeit in differing forms, by adherents to the basic principle of
suppressing business bribery of foreign officials. Although extant statutes
already forbid domestic political and commercial corruption almost every-
where, the new arrangements also forbid foreign corruption. The new
arrangements include specific provisions on extradition and prosecution
so that, eventually, deviation in implementation and laxness in enforce-
ment may also be addressed.
The OAS is a regional association embracing the Western Hemisphere.
In 1994, the OAS adopted a Plan of Action aimed at strengthening democ-
racy and combating corruption.' 5 7 This step was followed in 1996 by the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC). The IACAC
requires national criminalization of the bribery of foreign officials, extradi-
tion of bribe-givers and bribe-takers, a pledge not to invoke bank secrecy
laws to impede investigations, and criminalization of public officials' pos-
session or acquisition of assets not reasonably explainable by lawful earn-
ings.15 8 The IACAC process provides a model statute from which OAS
countries can work on illicit enrichment and transnational bribery that, in
the latter instance, essentially adopts the U.S. criminalization approach.
There is thus a source of comparison for specific Western Hemisphere
statutes.
IACAC is open to ratification by any country. The obligation to enact
implementing legislation, however, is subject to the constitution and legal
system of each country as a form of escape clause. All countries are
required, to the degree their legal principles permit, to cooperate with
155. CARLJ. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND His GovERNMENT: AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF POLITICS
203-05 (1963).
156. See generally DAVID GAuthnIER, MORALS BY CONSENT (1986).
157. See OAS, First Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action (visited Jan. 23, 2001)
<http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htn,.
158. See Low et al., supra note 48, at 246-55; RexJ. Zedalis, Internationalizing Prohibi-
tions on Foreign Corrupt Practices: The OAS Convention and the OECD Revised Recommen-
dation, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 45-61 (1997).
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other countries in enforcement of their laws.159 The United States itself
included a reservation concerning illicit enrichment of public officials due
to its own constitutional problems. 160 The IACAC does not specify partic-
ular penalties, and only existing extradition treaties are extended to
include the Convention offenses. 161 There is no oversight or monitoring
mechanism, so implementation is left to national discretion, but the'Con-
vention does require extradition or prosecution.1 62 The IACAC does not
provide an exception for facilitating payments.163
"The OECD brings together 29 countries sharing the principles of the
market economy, pluralist democracy and respect for human rights."164
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions commits signatories to adopt FCPA-
like national legislation. In addition to the Convention, the OECD issued a
recommendation for the elimination of tax deductions for bribes, since
many member nations, including Canada, France, Japan, Luxembourg, and
West Germany, had laws permitting foreign bribe deductions provided the
identity of recipient and an adequate business purpose were disclosed
upon audit. Obviously, the stated policy could be ignored by benign neg-
lect in not pressing inquiry. 165 In fact, only two countries, the United
States and Belgium, explicitly denied tax deduction for the cost of foreign
bribes. 166
The EU presently comprises fifteen countries in Western and Central
Europe. Additional countries from Central and Eastern Europe are being
considered for eventual integration, in some form, into the EU. The EU is a
political confederation, common market, and monetary union moving
gradually toward a more federalist integration. Voting within the EU
reflects relative strength of the member nations. In 1996, the European
Council adopted the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involv-
ing Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States
of the European Union, criminalizing the payment of bribes to any official
of the EU or of an EU member nation.
159. See Low et al., supra note 48, at 248-59, 248 n.10 ("This limitation is primarily
directed to those countries that do not exercise jurisdiction over their nationals residing
or acting outside their territory.").
160. See id. at 249 n.14.
161. See id. at 253.
162. See id. at 255, 276-77.
163. See id. at 270.
164. OECD website, Membership (visited Jan. 23, 2001) <http://www.oecd.org/
about/general/member-countries.htm>.
165. See Activities of Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on Internal Relations, 94th Cong.
75 (1975); Slade, supra note 47, at 125 n.32.
166. A 1975 report by the IRS Commissioner found that only Belgium, which ranks
poorly on TI's CPI, adhered to a similar policy. The report noted West Germany,
France, Japan, and Luxembourg as permitting foreign bribe deductions where identity of
recipient and adequate business purpose are disclosed on audit. See Slade, supra note
47, at 125 n.32.
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In addition to the actions of the OAS, the OECD, and the EU, several
other international governmental organizations have begun to take steps
toward suppressing corruption in international business transactions. The
IMF 167 and the World Bank 168 have expressed strong interest in sup-
pressing official corruption, arising from the desire for efficient and effec-
tive use of their funds. In 1974, the U.N. began a process, still underway,
to regulate transnational corporations, that included anti-corruption provi-
sions. This process has tended to languish, partly because of the inher-
ently difficult dynamics of large-group bargaining and partly because of
the complexity of the regulatory scheme, which is to take the form of a
code of conduct for transnational corporations (TNCs). The 1996 U.N.
nonbinding declaration on corruption recommends criminalization and
elimination of the tax deductibility of bribes.169 MNEs will come to play
their role.170 In the mid-1990s, some 35,000 MNEs operated through
170,000 foreign subsidiaries. The 300 largest MNEs then controlled
twenty-five percent of the world's productive assets.171 Of the 1995 Busi-
ness Week "Global 1000" and "Top 100" firms, about eighty-eight percent
were based in the industrial market economies. Of the 1995 Fortune
"Global 500" firms, about ninety-five percent were based in those
economies.172
The simultaneous development of corruption-suppression efforts in
many international governmental and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) provides plausible evidence of an emerging anti-corruption
regime.173 It is important to appreciate the co-occurrence of these efforts.
The United States is the key linkage nation, holding membership in both
the OAS and the OECD, which are the lead multilateral organizations in
this regime development. Certain NGOs-especially the ICC and TI-have
also been driving forces in adoption of the OAS and OECD agreements.
167. See Mauro, supra note 121; Mauro, supra note 122.
168. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD 103-04 (1997). The report is critical of anti-corruption regulatory systems and
weak enforcement institutions. See id.; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 129; Ibrahim
Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15
DIcK. J. INT'L L. 451 (1997).
169. "At the United Nations, United States negotiators successfully persuaded the
General Assembly to adopt a [non-binding] Recommendation from the Economic and
Social Council against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Business
Transactions in 1996." Rubin, supra note 20, at 282 (citing remarks of U.S. Representa-
tive Prezell Robinson).
170. See David Hess & Thomas Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled
Approach-The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 593 (2000).
171. See WILLIAM H. LASH, THE EXAGGERATED DEMISE OF THE NATION STATE 8 (Center
for the Study of Amer. Bus., 1996) (citing U.N. estimates and Multinationals Back in
Fashion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 5).
172. See PRESTON & WINDSOR, supra note 27, at 52.
173. See Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized
Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks and Non-Governmental
Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CoNa.
INT'L L. J. 547 (2000).
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The United States is also an important member of the IMF, the World
Bank, and the U.N.
To overcome resistance, the United States must continue to exert lead-
ership. Three factors likely to contribute to overcoming this resistance are:
(1) a broad linkage agenda between Europe and the United States; (2) con-
cern abroad over domestic consequences of foreign bribery; and (3) con-
cern over the dramatic deterioration of conditions in Central and Eastern
Europe. Linkage creates the basis for collaboration, but European and Jap-
anese concerns create the motives for acting in that direction.
Although the United States is not a member of the EU, there is increas-
ing economic linkage between the United States and the European Union.
The New Transatlantic Agenda was launched by mutual agreement in
December 1995, and layered onto this agenda was the Transatlantic Eco-
nomic Partnership of May 1998.174 This agenda covers a large number
and broad range of policy concerns and constitutes a formal recognition of
the interdependence of the United States and the EU. "The United States
and the European Union (EU) enjoy an exceptionally broad and deep com-
monality of interests and values that form the basis of a dose, mutually
beneficial relationship."175
The United States has profound interests in driving consensus formu-
lations. For many years, the United States has argued the case for multilat-
eral suppression of international business corruption, while engaging in
unilateral suppression despite the costs of doing so. In this sense, the
United States has tried to provide an international social good.176 A social
good is characterized by collective consumption under conditions in which
exclusion from consumption by pricing is not feasible, once the good is
supplied, it is consumed for free by everyone. Social goods are examples of
market failure in the sense that the social good must be supplied either by
collective action-either by government with compulsive taxation power or
an associative club soliciting voluntary fees-or by action of someone with
sufficient intensity of demand or interest. There is demand for the good,
but no economic actor will rationally reveal such demand in order to enjoy
free ridership.
Social goods are of three types: public goods, merit goods, and club
goods. A public good is one supplied by a government under these condi-
tions. A club good is one supplied by a voluntary association. A merit
good is one that someone judges to be undersupplied by the market mecha-
nism. The notion of a merit good can include desirable moral values. It
has been argued that international public goods require an enforcement
174. See EU, State Dep't, Joint U.S./EU Action Plan (Dec. 3, 1995) 4http://
europa.eu.int/en/agenda/eu-us/pub/tai/apindx.htm>; EU, State Dep't, Transatlantic Eco-
nomic Partnership, Statement Released Following the U.S.-EU Summit (May 18, 1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eu/js_..980518_useu_econ.html>.
175. State Dep't, U.S.-EU Relations: Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau of European and
Canadian Affairs (May 26, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eu/
fs_980526_useu.html>.
176. See Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without International
Government, 76 Am. ECON. Rrv. 1, 1-13 (1986).
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agency to ensure implementation. 177 None of the anti-corruption agree-
ments provides for such an agency, so implementation must proceed, at
least partially, in a voluntary way.
The United States discovered that it could not unilaterally supply a
bribe-free global business environment, although it has come to view such
an environment as a public good for a variety of reasons. The international
negotiation process has been one of discovering bases by which to per-
suade the OAS, the OECD, and other multinational bodies to view a bribe-
free environment as a merit good to be supplied by regional or associative
club rather than global action. The leadership of the United States has led
to the situation in which all affected countries-advanced and other-have
effectively endorsed the principle of corruption suppression through at
least one international organization to which they belong. The United
States and certain NGOs promote voluntary compliance, ultimately acting
in combination with a gradual shift in the interests and attitudes of the
other OAS and OECD member nations.
In certain respects, however, many of the member nations of the OAS
and OECD may be reluctant participants. Resistance to implementation
has been noted in certain countries largely because of costs that must be
borne both in the transition to a bribe-suppression environment and in an
environment in which some actors continue to engage in bribery. For
example, the bank secrecy laws of Switzerland may need to be changed,
imposing costs on Swiss banks and their clientele.1 78 Joachim Grunewald,
former German State Secretary of Finance and the Federation of German
Industry were opposed to banning of transnational bribes because German
business would be constrained.' 79 German bribes have been estimated at
over $5 billion per year. 180 There is reportedly an "official French system
of bribery in less-developed countries," 181 and French implementation of
the OECD Convention makes allowances for French companies to deduct
some bribes if the payments are made under normal circumstances, are at
a reasonable level, can be shown to be in the interests of the company, and
the identity of the bribed person is revealed. 182
177. See Manuel Velasquez, International Business, Morality, and the Common Good, 2
Bus. ETHics Q. 27, 27-40 (1992).
178. See Michelle Moser, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy Laws Aimed at
Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 321 (1995); Rubin,
supra note 20, at 309.
179. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 290 n.187 (citing Beverly Earle, The United States
Foreign Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion
Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 234 (1996)).
180. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1277 n.12 (citing Omestad et al., supra note 105, at
43).
181. Id. at 1286 n.76 (citing Pascal Krop, L'Argent Noir da La France, L'EvamuNT,
Sept. 29, 1988, at 50, cited in John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L L.
1009, 1010 n.8 (1990)). Nesbit also cites Rosie Waterhouse, The Sleazy State: Britain
"Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials," IrnEP. (London), Mar. 16, 1994, at 3.
182. See Sarah Marks, France Takes Soft Line on Bribes for Business, EVENING STANDARD
(U.K.), Feb. 16, 1999, at 35.
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It has been reported that some small European nations do not regard
the global economy as a level playing-field. Bribe-paying has been seen as a
means for leveling the playing-field, and prohibitions against bribe-paying
amounts to exclusion of these companies from many opportunities.' 83
This complaint is particularly problematic because the European economy
is not as healthy as the U.S. economy.' 8 4 The argument made within the
United States upon the enactment of the FCPA, notably that U.S. compa-
nies would be harmed in competition against companies that were not pro-
hibited from offering bribes, has re-emerged in the OECD context.
Australian firms have expressed concern over potential business losses in
their competition with companies from non-OECD countries, even though
Australia has a relatively good BPI.' 8 5
Anti-corruption campaigns have been mounted recently in several
countries, albeit for largely domestic reasons. Japan has adopted "a fero-
cious anti-corruption campaign" due in part to its economic and political
difficulties. 186 One report suggests that Germany has become concerned
about companies engaging in domestic corruption because they have
become accustomed to paying foreign bribes.' 8 7 In Germany, former
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and others have recently been implicated in cam-
paign financing scandals. This concern mirrors speculation in the United
States prior to the passage of the FCPA that foreign bribery can have detri-
mental domestic consequences. 188 Italy has recently begun an investiga-
tion called "Clean Hands," which is directed at civil servants and
politicians who previously engaged in corruption without worry of the
consequences.189
Much of the European concern comes from the transition economies
of Central and Eastern Europe. "The single greatest threat to the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is corrup-
183. See Competitive Bidding, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at A12.
184. The aggregate unemployment rate in the EU was 8.8% in January 2000, down
from 9.5% in February 1999. See the EU, Eurostat (visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat> (reporting monthly-average International Labour
Organisation data collected from parties actively seeking civilian employment). Contin-
ued high unemployment greatly influenced the 1998 Schroeder election in which Ger-
man Chancellor Kohl was defeated. See Greg Steinmetz & Camille Rohwedder,
Germany's Schroeder Deals Kohl Firm Defeat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, at A20, cited in
Rubin, supra note 20, at 293 n.223.
185. See Stephen R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury?: Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative
Global Village, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 223, 225 n.15 (1999). The statement argued that non-
OECD countries would gain a competitive advantage relative to Australia. See supra
tbl.2.
186. Salbu, supra note 185, at 238 (citing Peter Tasker, Crusade Makes a Meal of Cor-
ruption Cleanup, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Apr. 12, 1998, at 11).
187. See Competitive Bidding, supra note 183.
188. See Press Release, Bus. WK., May 17, 1976, at 162, cited in Slade, supra note 47, at
125. Senator Proxmire stated, "If we permit bribery to become a regular policy of
United States corporations doing business abroad, it will only be a matter of time before
these same practices afflict our own domestic economic system." Id.
189. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 307-08.
Vol. 33
2000 Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption
don." 190 "The EU is also concerned about the prevalence of intra-commu-
nity fraud in connection with general EU funds dispensed to member
states for EU-approved expenditures. There is also concern about corrup-
tion's links with organized crime, drug trafficking, and money launder-
ing."19 1  These and other scandals and investigations have given
ammunition to TI and the ICC as they engage in public information cam-
paigns intended to promote citizen outrage at official corruption. Presum-
ably, revelations of corruption can also be used by U.S. diplomats in their
negotiations.
These three factors-broad linkage in U.S.-EU relations, concern over
domestic effects of bribery abroad, and concern over Central and Eastern
Europe-suggest that the currently developing anti-corruption regime is
more normative than moral in character. As noted above, a moral regime is
based on intrinsic commitment to shared values, while a normative regime
is based upon harmonized behavior regardless of motives. One quite
revealing and theoretically interesting aspect of the FCPA process is that
other advanced nations in the OECD have agreed, out of mixed motives
and despite value diversity, to consent in principle to multilateral action,
and such action is likely to increase gradually over time. Two decades,
since 1977, must be presumed to be enough time for states to have thought
about the matter, although of course policy-making may not proceed
according to that logic. The multilateral efforts reflect a concatenation of
circumstances, linkage of considerations, and mixed motives that do not
amount to a value consensus. However, a value consensus may not be
strictly necessary to a multilateral regime. The issue is not motive, but
behavior. If the OECD countries effectively halt, or greatly reduce, foreign
bribery by their enterprises, then behavior will have changed. One may
posit that after two decades, the European and Japanese governments have
roughly calculated the economic consequences and thus are prepared to
tolerate those consequences.
Within the context of the anti-corruption effort, there has been an
informative debate about the relationship between domestic morality and
transnational policy. Salbu and Nichols have each articulated extremes of
the controversy over global moral community building.19 2 Salbu urges the
moral and practical defects of the FCPA process; 193 Nichols urges the
human consequences of corruption and the likelihood of successful
action.194 Salbu's position argues that the world is not, at least yet, a nor-
mative global village. He accepts that value convergence and unified agen-
das could emerge in the future, but argues that multilateral policies or
190. Mahoney, supra note 117, at 236 (citing Stephen Potts, Director of the U.S. Office
of Government Ethics).
191. Rubin, supra note 20, at 275 n.94 (citing Simone White, Proposed Measures
Against Corruption of Officials in the European Union, 21 E.L. REv. DEC. 465 (1996)
(detailing corruption problems in the European Commission)).
192. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8; Nichols, supra note 33; Salbu, supra
note 33; Salbu, supra note 35; 4 Salbu, supra note 49; Salbu, supra note 185.
193. See Nichols, Regulating Bribery, supra note 8; Nichols, supra note 33.
194. See Salbu, supra note 33; Salbu, supra note 49; Salbu, supra note 185.
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extraterritorial application of unilateral policy should not precede such
convergence. His general condition is that, "[w]hen laws are imposed
across borders, there should be considerable transnational value consen-
sus. Otherwise, the imposition threatens to deny respect for legitimate
regional value variance." 195 A key consideration is what defines legitimate
in this context. Salbu's proposed strategy is persuasion rather than pres-
sure; in our view, the interest and value dispute will simply move back from
consensus on an anti-bribery campaign to disagreement over implementa-
tion details and enforcement. For Nichols, corruption is universally pro-
scribed by national laws and all major religious and moral schools of
thought, and institutional pressures can thus properly be brought to bear
against practitioners. 196
Each of these positions serves as a useful cautionary to the other, and
thus our position is somewhere in between. The general cases against brib-
ery are that it hampers global market functioning and local economic
development, undermines local administrative capability, and is a com-
mon-law offense against the natural rights of the people of any society.
These general cases do not constitute a rationale for a first mover to act
unilaterally against bribery and extortion, yet the United States did just
that in enacting the FCPA. The fundamental matter at the heart of the
FCPA is whether it has been a reasonable action by the United States. As
the policy has two distinct parts, the rationality of each part must be
considered.
The decision to prohibit foreign bribery by U.S. citizens and their
agents may well have been irrational. The United States proceeded on a
legislative impulse, under domestic political stress, and without a carefully
considered theory of sound policy. This decision turned out to have costs
and burdens, but it was not a decision easily reversed. Thus the second
part of the policy, the decision to influence everyone else in the world on
this matter, is highly rational. The first decision made the second inevita-
ble. Due to its first policy decision, the United States is compelled to pro-
mote the evolution of a moral community through changes first in
behavior, a normative regime, and then in expectations and attitudes, a
moral regime. 197
Over the past two decades, the United States has acted largely in a
persuasive manner. Had true pressure been brought to bear, multilateral
action may have occurred much sooner. Thus, the behavior of the United
States was consistent with Salbu's position, though Salbu might not accept
this argument. The United States recognized that its own interests would be
served if corruption suppression were multilateral. However, the United
195. Salbu, supra note 185, at 227. The counter-argument is that no real progress can
be made with corrupt officials. See Marjit Sugata & Heling Shi, On Controlling Crime
with Corrupt Officials, 34 J. ECON. BEHv. & ORG. 163, 171 (1998).
196. See Nesbit, supra note 8, at 1274 n.1 (citing Nichols, Outlawing Bribery, supra
note 8, at 318-21).
197. See Seita, supra note 22.
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States also apparently was committed to a corruption-free global economy
as a moral good.
The United States likely viewed bribery and extortion as a commons
problem, as argued by Slade. 198 In a commons tragedy, each individual
acts rationally to over-consume an apparently free good-corruption as a
small cost of business-without consideration of the long-term and global
consequence, namely the destruction of the commons. There is a rational
compulsion for every individual to participate in the behavior because
one's welfare is reduced by unilateral exit.199 Negotiation alone is insuffi-
cient for the solution of the problem due to the "freeloader effect"; thus,
enforcement is also necessary.200 This is precisely the situation the United
States faced for twenty years. Interestingly, the effort by the United States
over these past two decades is becoming vindicated as other countries are
beginning to see the commons problem inherent in bribery and extor-
tion.20 1 The effectiveness of U.S. efforts, however, appears to lie in appeals
made on pragmatic grounds, rather than those made on moral grounds.
Conclusion
Elaine Sternberg argues that one must decide whether to attempt business
in "disorderly jurisdictions" and "pariah regimes"1202 and comments that
international boycotts and campaigning for international regulation are
generally ineffective and counterproductive. "The way for a business to ful-
fill its moral responsibilities is not to legislate for others, but to make sure
that its own conduct is ethical."203 The United States, for a variety of rea-
sons, has moved from unilateral refusal to bribe abroad to insistence on
multilateral anti-corruption action contrary to this admonition. The OAS
and OECD member nations, following generally the path marked out by
the 1977 FCPA, are now embarked on the next few stages of an emerging
global anti-corruption campaign. However, gradually and perhaps cyni-
cally, this campaign is becoming an expanding torrent in scope, intensity,
and participation. Moral authority for an international policy regime has
been established since no one can actively endorse bribery and extortion,
although customary gifts and gratuities are arguably quite different.
Regional (OAS) and associative (OECD) action is moving faster than U.N.
and WTO action, in part because global, large-membership organizations
are more difficult to influence and drive. The whole matter has been
backed into by happenstance.
In domestic law, one may seek to define optimal statutory policy,
while recognizing the mixed motives inherent in the positive nature of legis-
lation drafted in a political process. In international law, one may seek to
define optimal dispute settlement and conflict resolution strategy while
198. See Slade, supra note 47, at 123-25.
199. See id. at 127 n.37.
200. See id. at 126.
201. See id. at 127.
202. Sternberg, supra note 86, at 31-36.
203. Id. at 35-36.
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recognizing global value diversity. Multilateral cooperation to suppress for-
eign bribery and domestic corruption involves both domestic and interna-
tional levels of action. The cooperation arrangements are diffuse rather
than focused: at issue are (1) matters of foreign enterprise bribery; (2)
money laundering arising in illegal drug trafficking; (3) the spread of
organized crime; (4) the future of the transitional economies of Central and
Eastern Europe arising out of the collapse of the Soviet empire; (5) domes-
tic political and commercial corruption in OECD advanced economies; (6)
domestic political and commercial corruption in the developing and emer-
gent countries; and (7) the burden widespread, and arguably growing, cor-
ruption places on the various instruments available to OECD advanced
economies for assisting the global development process.
Evidence is beginning to suggest that corruption originating in local
circumstances becomes a form of a general tax by private parties, acting,
under cover of public office, levied on both foreign inflows and domestic
transactions. Since the OECD advanced countries cannot simply disen-
gage from the rest of the world, first complaint and then concrete action
was likely going to occur eventually. The only issue historically was where
and how that process would begin. The United States has paid some likely
serious price, including economic and diplomatic costs, for leadership in
this arena of international policy regime development. An interesting ques-
tion that arises is whether such moral leadership can occur entirely by
example and influence, without some element of coercion or threat.
These circumstances and forces have produced multilateral anti-cor-
ruption conventions, and these arrangements are becoming normative
regimes as they are implemented, enforced, and accepted as a way of life.
The regime development process may be gradual, prolonged, and bumpy,
but an evolutionary or adaptive process is at work, and overall the process
will be unidirectional. Further, there is a possibility that the normative
regime could develop with time and experience into a moral regime. While
one may turn a blind eye to corruption, one cannot positively endorse it.
Perhaps more importantly, the emerging regime is also becoming a cam-
paign for democracy and market-oriented development, replete with attend-
ant, necessarily moralistic qualities. In the end, though, it is not important
whether or not the anti-corruption regimes evolve from normative to moral
and become universally valued. For the sake of all those negatively affected
by corruption, what is important is that corrupt behaviors decline and
then cease.
